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THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT:  
WHAT DOES IT REALLY DO? 
 
JOHN G. DAY1 
 
*** 
“We have to pass the health care bill so you can find out what’s in it,” 
Speaker Nancy Pelosi, March 10, 2010 on the floor of the House 
of Representatives urging her colleagues to pass the ACA. 
 
*** 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
We are now well into full implementation of the Affordable Care 
Act and, despite some distinct improvements, the nation is learning to live 
with reduced expectations about the benefits of that legislation.  The 
exchanges’ initial rollout was chaotic,2 deductibles and co-pays are high on 
the cheaper individual plans sold on the exchanges,3 insurers on the 
exchanges are seeking rate hikes,4 and important state participation has not 
emerged as anticipated.  As of March 2016, only 31 states plus the District 
of Columbia were participating in the ACA’s Medicaid expansion program 
                                                                                                                                      
1 Professor in Residence, University of Connecticut School of Law, 1999-
2014; former Insurance Commissioner of the Commonwealth of Virginia and 
Senior Vice President and Chief Counsel at CIGNA for the pension, healthcare and 
investment divisions.  Updates and edits to this article were made by Patricia A. 
McCoy at Boston College Law School. 
2 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-238, 
HEALTHCARE.GOV:  CMS HAS TAKEN STEPS TO ADDRESS PROBLEMS, BUT NEEDS 
TO FURTHER IMPLEMENT SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT (2014), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/668834.pdf. 
3 See Robert Pear et al., Cost of Coverage Under Affordable Care Act to 
Increase in 2015, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/ 
15/us/politics/cost-of-coverage-under-affordable-care-act-to-increase-in-
2015.html?_r=0.  See generally GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-312, 
PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE: EARLY EVIDENCE FINDS PREMIUM TAX CREDIT 
LIKELY CONTRIBUTED TO EXPANDED COVERAGE, BUT SOME LACK ACCESS TO 
AFFORDABLE PLANS (2015). 
4 See Margot Sanger-Katz, Get Ready for Higher Obamacare  
Rates Next Year, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/07/ 
upshot/get-ready-for-higher-obamacare-rates-next-year.html?_r=0. 
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while 19 states were not.5 In 2016, only 12 states and the District of 
Columbia had their own exchanges; fully 27 states participated in the 
federal exchange.6 Meanwhile, the White House delayed the effective date 
of the ACA’s employer mandates following business community 
resistance.7 Many continue to resent the individual mandate8 despite the 
Supreme Court’s decision upholding that mandate in 2012.9  
Opponents have grown more shrill and much of the rhetoric, 
including over 50 “ceremonial” repeals of the ACA in the House as of June 
2015,10 were geared towards making ACA's implementation shortfalls and 
misunderstandings of what the ACA does into a 2016 presidential 
campaign issue. Not only do many legislators not know or even care what 
                                                                                                                                      
5 See STATUS OF STATE ACTION ON THE MEDICAID EXPANSION DECISION, 
KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (2016), http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-
activity-around-expanding-medicaid-under-the-affordable-care-act/. 
6 See STATE HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETPLACE TYPES, 2016, KAISER FAMILY 
FOUND. (2016), http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-health-insurance-
marketplace-types/.  Four more states have federally supported marketplaces and 7 
states have state partnership marketplaces.  Id. 
7 See EMPLOYER RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, 
KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (2015), http://kff.org/infographic/employer-responsibility-
under-the-affordable-care-act/. Strictly speaking, the ACA does not require 
employers to provide their employees with health insurance. However, large 
employers must pay penalties to the Internal Revenue Service if they do not 
provide affordable health insurance coverage to their workers. The Obama 
Administration delayed the original effective date of that employer mandate until 
January 1, 2015 for employers with at least 100 employees and until January 1, 
2016 for employers with at least 50 to 99 employees.  Id. 
8 Under the ACA’s individual mandate, individuals who can afford minimum 
essential health insurance but decide not to buy it must either qualify for a health 
coverage exemption or pay a penalty. The individual mandate went into effect on 
January 1, 2014. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2015); HealthCare.gov, The Fee you Pay 
if you Don’t Have Health Coverage, https://www.healthcare.gov/fees-
exemptions/fee-for-not-being-covered/. For discussion of the continued resentment 
in some quarters toward the individual mandate, see Dante Atkins, King v. Burwell 
Unpopular, but Anti-ACA Propaganda Having Lasting Effects, DAILY KOS (Apr. 
12, 2015), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2015/04/12/1376255/-King-v-Burwell-
unpopular-but-anti-ACA-propaganda-having-lasting-effects. 
9 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012). 
10 See, e.g., Manu Raju & Burgess Everett, GOP lawmakers: Time to move on 
from Obamacare repeal, POLITICO (June 25, 2015, 6:57 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2015/06/gop-lawmakers-time-to-move-on-from-
obamacare-repeal-119439. 
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is in the ACA, much of the public does not understand their options and 
fears the ACA's potential impact on their choice of care and how it will be 
paid for.11  
To date, most of the commentary and anxiety has centered over the 
ACA's access provisions and the mandate. Yet there is much more in the 
ACA that has been largely ignored.  
Most believe the ACA was designed only to provide quality 
healthcare to all Americans through a pluralistic public and private system: 
private individual and small-employer-sponsored insurance, employer-
provided insurance, and several government programs. The private or 
market component would be realized through centralized insurance 
marketplaces (known as exchanges), both for individuals and small 
employers (with less than 50 workers), and eventually through larger 
employers. The government component would be provided primarily 
through Medicaid and Medicare.  
The ACA sets into motion a number of dynamics that will build 
upon a number of social and economic forces discussed in Section I and 
that will eventually realize its goal of universal coverage, but not in the 
way most anticipated it would do when the legislation was passed in 2010. 
Instead of a pluralistic public and private system, the final coverage vehicle 
will eventually become a single government program for everyone 
administered by private entities that only process enrollment, collect 
premiums and pay claims – very much like Medicare today.  This will 
occur because the ACA will create an environment where both individual 
and institutional providers, employers, the general public and the states will 
become natural allies for a universal health care system much like 
Medicare.  This surprising coalition will overwhelm the “free enterprise” 
advocates and force Congress to embrace a single payer “not-for-profit” 
system.  The ACA and the emerging social and economic forces propelling 
it will produce this result in a very chaotic and untidy chain of events over 
the next decade. 
In addition, the ACA will do much more than just expand access to 
coverage. Over time the ACA will transform not only how one pays for 
care, but how care is delivered.  The ACA will transform today's medical 
professional paradigm from a fee-for-service entrepreneurial “sickness” 
                                                                                                                                      
11 See, e.g., KAISER HEALTH POLICY TRACKING POLL:  THE PUBLIC’S VIEWS ON 
THE ACA, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (2016), http://kff.org/interactive/kaiser-health- 
tracking-poll-the-publics-views-on-the-aca/#?response=Favorable--Unfavorable&  
aRange=twoYear (last viewed July 10, 2016). 
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model into a not-for-profit “wellness model” where the medical profession 
will regain much of the clinical autonomy it lost over the last 30 years.  
Many also believe that the ACA will result in better quality healthcare at 
lower cost largely because of concepts that permeate the ACA: value rather 
than volume purchasing and in particular comparative effectiveness 
research (CER).12 This cost reduction may happen, but the experience in 
other countries makes this outcome indeterminate.  
What is more certain is that the ACA will result in a more efficient 
health care system, where decisions in clinical evaluations will balance the 
incremental benefits of any treatment with its incremental cost and the 
efficacy of new interventions compared to existing ones. Such a 
comparison should result in better health outcomes and resource allocation 
than we have today, viewed from a population perspective. This increased 
efficiency may even result in a higher rather than a lower or a flatter cost 
curve relative to gross domestic product because of the transaction costs of 
moving the system towards “evidence-based medicine” and clinical 
decision-making that takes into account the marginal cost and benefit of 
any treatment. Once these initial costs are absorbed, the desired cost impact 
may be realized. 
This Article is divided into four parts. 
Section I will start with a brief description of the major social, 
economic, demographic, technological and political trends within which 
the ACA will be implemented and evolve over the next decade. This 
context is essential to understanding how the various ACA provisions will 
change or influence the direction of major components of the health care 
system and where things could go wrong. This context is also essential for 
making reasonable estimates of the political forces affected by the ACA 
and vice-versa and, therefore, what the U.S. healthcare system will look 
like in 2025. 
Section II will describe how the ACA's provisions attempt to 
realize a pluralistic private/government access solution and how these 
efforts will set the stage for eliminating the private institutional sector from 
financial “risk taking,” diminish private insurers’ role in the delivery of 
care and hasten the exit of employers from their traditional role of 
sponsoring coverage.  
One of the more significant unintended consequences of the ACA 
will be public dissatisfaction and jaundice regarding the private sector’s 
ability to finance and deliver healthcare better than the government. At the 
                                                                                                                                      
12 See infra Section III. 
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same time, the high cost for some of mandatory health insurance, rising 
deductibles and co-pays, and polarization of politics on the state and 
federal level will increase the public's distrust of government. Yet there are 
segments within the private sector where public opinion of the ACA is 
quite favorable and one of those areas involves clinicians delivering 
medical care. The ACA’s structural changes will enhance rather than 
diminish the role and independence of clinicians regarding medical 
decisions.  
Section III will examine several parts of the ACA that have not 
received much public attention.  These include value-based purchasing, 
comparative effectiveness research, and several related ACA provisions 
which will dramatically change how new medical technology and new and 
existing practices are evaluated and delivered.  
CER and these structural changes will reinforce the shift from 
today's entrepreneurial “for-profit” paradigm to a "not-for-profit” 
professional paradigm.  That, in turn, will change how society and the 
medical profession view how much autonomy and regulation is proper 
regarding clinical medical decision-making and how providers should be 
compensated for such care.  
The Article concludes with a prediction of the future evolution of 
the health care system under several possible scenarios based on different 
changes in control of the Congress and the White House, as well as other 
changes in the political landscape.  
Interestingly enough, all of the scenarios, when viewed in the 
changing social and economic environment discussed in Section I, lead 
towards a common destination: a single government health care system for 
all that will resemble Medicare in structure and administration. 
 
I. THE CULTURAL, ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, TECHNOLOGICAL 
AND DEMOGRAPHIC CONTEXT OF THE ACA  
 
There are a number of societal changes underway that help explain 
the structure of the ACA, the challenges it must overcome and the 
importance of its dominating philosophies:  value-based purchasing and 
comparative effectiveness research. These societal trends, while different, 
are very much interrelated and affect one another. 
First and foremost, everyone, irrespective of his or her ideological 
or political bent or economic status, wants the employer out of the middle 
of the U.S. healthcare finance system. Market-oriented individuals would 
replace the employer sponsor with the individual worker via co-pays or a 
voucher-type system. The left would substitute government for the 
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employer. Employers, both large and small, just want out.13  Employers 
would still be involved via specific or general taxes or possibly some 
defined contribution type of benefit, but their present role as sponsors of 
health insurance coverage would be greatly diminished. 
Another important influence is that the ACA favors network care 
control by the medical profession. The ACA does this in a number of ways, 
but primarily through its endorsement of a new type of network for 
Medicare called an “Accountable Healthcare Organization” or ACO.  The 
ACO is a clinician-controlled network based on primary care physicians, 
electronic health records and collaboration between primary care 
physicians and ancillary and specialist providers participating in the 
network.  The ACO mechanism seeks to make health care providers more 
accountable for healthcare savings and improved health outcomes through 
financial carrot and sticks.  While originally limited to Medicare, the ACO 
concept is rapidly spreading throughout other government programs, such 
as Medicaid, and the private delivery system.14  
Of equal importance is the fact that the ACA’s exchange 
regulations do not create a favorable environment for a for-profit (public 
company) insurer.  For example, every exchange must have more than one 
insurer and one of these must be a “not-for-profit” entity.15  In addition, the 
ACA requires insurance participants to offer generous coverage (known as 
“essential health benefits”)16 with virtually no underwriting,17 meet 
                                                                                                                                      
13 For some very preliminary estimates of the extent to which the availability 
of individual insurance on the exchanges encourages employers to refrain from 
sponsoring health coverage, see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-
768, PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT:  ESTIMATE OF THE 
EFFECT ON THE PREVALENCE OF EMPLOYER-SPONSORED HEALTH COVERAGE 
(2012). 
14 See Atul Gawande, Overkill, THE NEW YORKER (May 22, 2015) at 53; 
Tricia McGinnis, A Unicorn Realized?  Promising Medicaid ACO Programs 
Really Exist, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND BLOG (March 11, 2015), 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/blog/2015/mar/unicorn-realized-
medicaid-acos (“hundreds of ACOs [are] now sprouting up in an array of shapes 
and sizes in Medicare, Medicaid, and the commercial sector”). 
15 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 
10104(q), 124 Stat. 902 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18054(a)(1), (a)(3)). 
16 Id. § 10104(b), 124 Stat. 896 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18022(a)-(b)). 
“Essential health benefits must include items and services within at least the 
following 10 categories: ambulatory patient services; emergency services; 
hospitalization; maternity and newborn care; mental health and substance use 
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required loss ratios (i.e., returning between 80% and 85% of premiums 
collected in the form of insurance benefits),18 and operate subject to rate 
regulation19 and traditional insurance solvency regulation20 that stresses 
adequate capital. 
Competing dynamics inherent in a mixed free market operating 
under a public utility regulatory structure will force traditional insurance 
companies to either abstain from participating in many exchanges (many 
have already) or be selective about where they will participate (a form of 
underwriting).21  These dynamics will force these companies to move even 
more quickly than they are today towards the administration of premium 
and claims management rather than assuming risk. Already traditional 
insurance companies are desperately looking for new missions, such as 
“case management,” much like the March of Dimes looked for a new 
disease after tuberculosis was conquered. 
                                                                                                                                      
disorder services, including behavioral health treatment; prescription drugs; 
rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices; laboratory services; preventive 
and wellness services and chronic disease management; and pediatric services, 
including oral and vision care.” Essential Health Benefits, HEALTHCARE.GOV 
(Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/essential-health-benefits/ 
(2015). Minimum essential coverage does not include specialized coverage, such 
as coverage only for vision care or dental care or workers’ compensation or 
disability policies.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1501(b), 124 
Stat. 244 (2010) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f)(3)); see 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-
91(c). 
17 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1201(2)(A), (4), 124 Stat. 
154–55 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg(a), 300gg-3(a)). 
18 See, e.g., id. § 9016, 124 Stat. 872 (2010) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 
833(c)(5)). 
19 See, e.g., Ann Mills et al., Truth and Consequences – Insurance Premium 
Rate Regulation and the ACA, 363 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 899, 899-900 (2010). 
20 See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1322(c)(5), 124 
Stat. 190 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18042(c)(5)). 
21 See, e.g., Reed Abelson & Agustin Armendariz, In Colorado, Disparity in 
Health Plan Prices Underscores Ambitions, and Limits, of Affordable Care Act, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/20/business/in-year-
2-of-affordable-care-act-premiums-diverge-widely.html?_r=0; U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-657, PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE 
CARE ACT:  LARGEST ISSUERS OF HEALTH COVERAGE PARTICIPATED IN MOST 
EXCHANGES, AND NUMBER OF PLANS AVAILABLE VARIED (2014) (Insurers who 
pick and choose the geographic areas in which they choose to underwrite often do 
so to avoid areas with higher proportions of costly high-risk patients.). 
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One of the more important societal changes over the last 50 years 
is information technology (IT).  IT has transformed virtually every aspect 
of our lives. Medicine is no exception. As hardware capabilities and 
processer capacity have grown geometrically, huge datasets have been 
created that can be updated in real time from many diverse government and 
private entities.  
Just Google and peruse the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care,22 
which compiles data on virtually every aspect of medicine – – not only 
with respect to practice variations, but also outcomes of alternative 
treatments. The Dartmouth Atlas is just one of many ongoing analyses 
taking advantage of this technology.  Vast data sets can now be 
manipulated in an almost infinite number of ways, even down to the zip 
code level. This new capability will enable government and other 
healthcare entities to analyze new delivery and financing structures and 
clinical interventions in terms of outcomes and cost efficiency.   
This IT capability makes CER not just a theory but a reality. The 
ACA also stresses substituting traditional medical charting with electronic 
records, which will enhance the coordination and continuity of care.23 Last 
but not least, the new IT capabilities will facilitate the movement away 
from fee-for-service reimbursement to bundled payments,24 which will 
enable enhanced coordination and continuity of care and network 
accountability.    
Another critical dynamic is the significant distrust the public has 
for many public and private institutions, which influences their comfort 
                                                                                                                                      
22 DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTH CARE, http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/ (last 
viewed June 28, 2015). 
23 See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, §§ 1104(b)(2)(C), 
3002(d), 124 Stat. 147, 365 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320(i)(4)(B), 
1395w-4(m)(7)). 
24 Under a bundled payment system, a payer such as Medicare makes one 
payment for services rendered by two or more providers during a one episode of 
care or a specified time period.  See, e.g., Bundled Payments, AMERICAN MEDICAL 
ASS’N, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/advocacy/state-advocacy-arc/state-
advocacy-campaigns/private-payer-reform/state-based-payment-reform/evaluating-
payment-options/bundled-payments.page (last viewed July 6, 2015). Bundled 
payments essentially place the risk of the cost of medical services for a particular 
episode on healthcare providers.  See Suzanne Delbanco, The Payment Reform 
Landscape: Bundled Payment, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (July 2, 2014), 
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/07/02/the-payment-reform-landscape-bundled-
payment/. 
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level regarding with whom, if anyone, they will share their decision making 
power – – especially on a sensitive subject like healthcare.  Government is 
one of the least trusted, while the medical profession is the most trusted. 
This disparity is clearly reflected in the ACA's provisions regarding the 
implementation of CER process, with its focus on voluntary adoption of 
best treatment options, transparency and related measures.25  
The ACA’s task is a formidable one, fundamentally changing over 
one-seventh of the U.S. economy.26  Many things will go wrong, especially 
during the early stages, which will only enhance the public's 
disenchantment with the private sector's ability and to a lesser degree the 
government's ability to solve the problem of access and affordability. 
Another important trend relates to the median wage in the United 
States. For a variety of reasons, the median wage has remained relatively 
stagnant since the 1970s27 and wealth inequality has increased dramatically 
over that same period.28 At the same time, the cost of medical care grew 
faster than GDP through 2009 in the United States.29 This combination of 
                                                                                                                                      
25 See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1552, 124 Stat. 258 
(2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(1)(A)(i)(VIII)). 
26 See CTRS. FOR MEDICAID AND MEDICARE SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH 
EXPENDITURE DATA: HISTORICAL, http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-
and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/NationalHealthAccountsHistorical.html (last 
viewed June 28, 2015) (In 2013, healthcare expenditures accounted for 17.4% of 
the U.S. gross domestic product.). 
27 See, e.g., Drew DeSilver, For Most Workers, Real Wages Have Barely 
Budged for Decades, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Oct. 9, 2014), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/10/09/for-most-workers-real-wages-
have-barely-budged-for-decades/. 
28 See, e.g., Nine Charts About Wealth Inequality in the United States, URBAN 
INST. (Feb. 2009), http://datatools.urban.org/Features/wealth-inequality-charts/. 
29 See Veronique de Rugy, U.S. Healthcare Spending More Than Twice the 
Average for Development Countries, MERCATUS CENTER—GEORGE MASON 
UNIVERSITY (Sept. 17, 2013), http://mercatus.org/publication/us-health-care-
spending-more-twice-average-developed-countries. From 2010 through 2013, 
healthcare expenditures in the U.S. grew at approximately the same rate as GDP. 
CTRS. FOR MEDICAID AND MEDICARE SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES 
2013 HIGHLIGHTS, http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-
Systems/Statistics-Trends-and Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/ 
highlights.pdf.  In 2014, healthcare expenditures once again surpassed GDP.  CTRS. 
FOR MEDICAID AND MEDICARE SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES 2014 
HIGHLIGHTS, https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-
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forces increased the ranks of the uninsured. The ACA’s expansion of 
Medicaid to 133% of the federal poverty level30 and its use of tax credits 
and subsidies for coverage purchased through the exchanges31 attempt to 
ameliorate the impact of the growing unaffordable cost of health care.  The 
Supreme Court’s 2015 decision upholding the payment of subsidies in 
states with federal exchanges32 removed the legal doubt surrounding the 
continuation of those subsidies in all fifty states. 
Then there is our aging population,33 which will only bolster the 
number of Medicare recipients over the next several decades. Entitlement 
reform, while inevitable, may change eligibility and the generosity of 
benefits, but it will not alter the basic structure of a government-run safety 
net for the elderly.  
Medicare combined with other government programs paid 43% of 
the total expenditures on healthcare in 2013.34  Even with entitlement 
reform, government monies will dominate the healthcare system. 
Accordingly, virtually all providers, both private and institutional, depend 
now and will increasingly depend upon government revenues. The entity 
that controls the purse strings is also in a position to impose conditions for 
receipt of these monies and influence the contours of the system.  
Decisions regarding government programs and in particular 
Medicare will influence both the private and government health care 
system. For example, in 1980, Medicare changed hospital reimbursement 
from fee-for-service to a prospective payment system.35  If a hospital 
                                                                                                                                      
Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/highlights.pdf; Paul 
Handley, US economic growth in 2014 fastest in four years, AFP (Jan. 30, 2015),  
https://www.yahoo.com/news/us-economy-grew-2-6-q4-slower-expected- 
135115848.html?ref=gs. 
30 See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 2001(a)(1), 124 
Stat. 271 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(1)(A)(i)(VIII)). 
31 See, e.g., id. §§ 1401-1421, 124 Stat. 213-242 (2010). 
32 King v. Burwell, No. 14-114, slip op. at 5 (U.S. Jul. 27, 2015). 
33 See Aging Statistics, ADMINISTRATION ON AGING, http://www.aoa.acl.gov/ 
Aging_Statistics/index.aspx. (last viewed June 28, 2015). 
34 See CTRS. FOR MEDICAID AND MEDICARE SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH 
EXPENDITURE DATA: NHE FACT SHEET, http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-
Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/NHE 
-Fact-Sheet.html (last viewed June 28, 2015) (computations by editor).  
35 See, e.g., RAND CORP., EFFECTS OF MEDICARE’S PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT 
SYSTEM ON THE QUALITY OF HOSPITAL CARE, 
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received just one penny of Medicare funds, it was required to charge that 
rate to all other Medicare beneficiaries. Shortly thereafter, private payers 
began to mimic Medicare's prospective payment approach in one form or 
another.36 The same occurred with respect to the reimbursement of 
physicians. Today, under the ACA, Medicare hospitals and ACO providers 
must also participate in a “shared savings” reimbursement system, which is 
accompanied by many practice and quality standards.37  
To summarize, the Affordable Care Act was unveiled amidst an 
environment where household wages were stagnant, employers wanted to 
drop health insurance benefits for their workers, the government sought 
lower health costs and better health outcomes, insurers were already 
contemplating an exit from underwriting, information technology made it 
possible to pinpoint more effective treatments, and people placed their trust 
in their doctors, not in insurers or the government.   For the reasons that 
Section II describes in further detail, the design of the ACA interacts with 
these dynamics to create an unstable situation where employers, insurers, 
and the public will increasingly reject the ACA’s hybrid private-public 
model in favor of a single-payer, government system of health insurance 
coverage. 
  
II. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACA'S “BALKANIZED” 
APPROACH TO THE UNINSURED: DIRECT GOVERNMENT 
COVERAGE AND ACCESS TO COVERAGE VIA THE 
PRIVATE SECTOR AND MANDATES 
 
This section describes how the ACA attempts to: 1) extend 
coverage to the uninsured; 2) preserve a central role for private sector “for-
profit” risk-takers, a.k.a. insurance companies; and 3) maintain and even 
expand employers’ historic role as the primary sponsors of health plan 
benefits. This section will argue that the ACA will only have partial 
success regarding access to affordable care and will have just the opposite 
                                                                                                                                      
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_briefs/2006/RAND_RB4519
-1.pdf. 
36 See Cherie Phillips, Private Health Insurance, CASE WESTERN RESERVE 
UNIVERSITY, http://www.cwru.edu/med/epidbio/mphp439/Private_ 
Insurance.htm (last viewed June 28, 2015).  
37 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 3022, 124 Stat. 395 
(2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj). 
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of its intended effect regarding private sector risk-takers and employer 
participation.  
The ACA takes several different approaches to getting health 
insurance coverage to the uninsured.  One approach is to expand Medicaid 
to more people38 (though the states have to concur in this expansion as a 
result of a 2012 Supreme Court decision).39 Another is to require all 
insurance plans -- both insured and self-insured -- to contain certain 
provisions, such as guaranteed issue, limits on pre-existing conditions, 
preventive exams, coverage for dependents up to age 26, and no lifetime 
dollar limits.40 Still another is a vehicle for individuals and small groups to 
purchase coverage in a government-regulated marketplace called an 
insurance exchange41 -- this is a guaranteed access approach to insurance 
rather than direct government insurance. 
Access to coverage is not the same as providing direct or automatic 
coverage.  Instead, individuals and small employers have to be eligible for 
the coverage and pay for it.  When one has access rather than direct 
coverage, individuals and groups purchase coverage through private for-
profit and not-for-profit insurance companies.  Individuals and small 
employers are encouraged to exercise this right to access through penalties 
for not having minimum coverage42 and means testing what one has to pay 
for coverage through tax credits and subsidies.43 
These initiatives will not be successful or at a minimum will fall 
far short of their intended objectives. In fact, this Article argues that these 
well-intentioned initiatives will have two unintended opposite effects: 1) 
the development of a broad public consensus that private “for-profit” 
enterprises cannot play a constructive role in the financing and delivery of 
affordable quality healthcare; and 2) facilitating and incentivizing 
                                                                                                                                      
38 See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 2001(a)(1), 124 
Stat. 271 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(1)(A)(i)(VIII)). 
39 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012).  
40 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, §§ 1001(5), 1201(2)(A), (4), 
10103(a), 10104(b), 124 Stat. 131-32, 154-56, 892, 896 (2010) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 300gg(a), 300gg-1(a), 300gg-2, 300gg-3, 300gg-4, 300gg-11, 300gg-13, 
300gg-14, 18022(a)-(b)). 
41 Id. § 1311(b)(1), 124 Stat. 173 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1) 
(2010)); see also King v. Burwell, No. 14-114, slip op. at 5 (U.S. Jul. 27, 2015). 
42 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1501(b), 124 Stat. 244 (2010) 
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A). 
43 See id. §§ 1401–21, 124 Stat. 213–42 (2010). 
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employers to reduce rather than expand or maintain their operative role in 
the present system. 
Before summarizing the details of the ACA's access components 
and the challenges the ACA faces in realizing its access objectives, it is 
useful to examine the demographics of the uninsured population. The 
demographics explain why the ACA has so many different thresholds 
regarding and rules for eligibility, mandates, and means-tested ACA tax 
incentives. 
 
A. THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE UNINSURED AND THE 
DYSFUNCTIONAL “INDIVIDUAL AND SMALL GROUP” PRIVATE 
INSURANCE MARKET 
 
As of 2010 (when the ACA was enacted), the U.S. had 49.9 million 
uninsured individuals, comprising 18.4% of the non-elderly population.44  
Numerous uninsured individuals that year did not have coverage because 
they were either not working or their employers did not offer coverage.45  
In addition, many had low motivation to get coverage either because they 
were young and viewed themselves as invulnerable or coverage was 
unaffordable in the individual market.  Even in the employer-sponsored 
market, employer and employee contributions were perceived to be too 
high.46  Reduced to essentials, for those individuals, the cost of coverage 
                                                                                                                                      
44 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE 
COVERAGE: 2010 - Tables & Figures, fig. 7, tbl. 8, http://www.census.gov/hhes/ 
www/hlthins/data/incpovhlth/2010/tables.html; DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVS., OVERVIEW OF THE UNINSURED IN THE UNITED STATES:  A SUMMARY OF THE 
2011 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (Sept. 2011), http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/ 
2011/cpshealthins2011/ib.shtml (reporting that the age ranges of the uninsured that 
year were as follows: 9.8% were below the age of 18; 29.7% were between 19 and 25 
years of age; 28.4% were between 25 and 34 years; and 38.1% were between 35 and 64 
years of age. In terms of income, 58.7% earned less than $50,000 a year and 15.4% 
earned between $50,000 and $74,999 a year.). 
45 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OVERVIEW OF THE 
UNINSURED IN THE UNITED STATES:  A SUMMARY OF THE 2011 CURRENT 
POPULATION SURVEY (Sept. 2011), http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/2011 
/cpshealthins2011/ib.shtml.  
46 See Recent Premium Increases Imposed by Insurers Averaged 20% for 
People Who Buy Their Own Health Insurance, Kaiser Survey Finds, KAISER 
FAMILY FOUND. (June 21, 2010), http://kff.org/private-insurance/press-
release/recent-premium-increases-imposed-by-insurers-averaged-20-for-people-
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exceeded the perceived value of or need for health insurance coverage 
relative to other uses of one’s money, particularly for people squeezed by 
flat wages and job instability. 
For years the individual and small group markets (defined as 
employers with less than 50 full-time employees) had been dysfunctional.  
The pools in this market were spread among many blocks of individuals 
and small employers.  As a result the pools available for distributing risk 
were much smaller than those available to larger companies or associations 
to aggregate risk.47 In addition, the individuals in these markets were not as 
healthy as those in the larger group market because of poverty and related 
reasons.48  
Affordability was exacerbated in the individual and small group 
markets because of the small pools, not only because small pools inhibit 
efficient risk distribution but also because of the increased transaction costs 
associated with the robust underwriting necessary to minimize adverse 
selection in an unhealthy population. Affordability was also hampered by 
the inability of insurance companies to realize economies of scale when 
setting up and administering many individual and small group policies.49  
In addition, individuals and employers pre-ACA were not required 
to buy or provide coverage.  Those who sought coverage were often turned 
down to reduce adverse selection.50 Insurers excluded coverage of pre-
                                                                                                                                      
who-buy-their-own-health-insurance-kaiser-survey-finds/; see also L. Levitt, G. 
Claxton & A. Damico, Measuring the Affordability of Employer Health Coverage, 
KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Aug. 24, 2011), http://www.kff.org/health-
costs/perspective/measuring-the-affordability-of-employer-health-coverage/; 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OVERVIEW OF THE UNINSURED IN 
THE UNITED STATES:  A SUMMARY OF THE 2011 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY 
(Sept. 2011), http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/2011/cpshealthins2011/ib.shtml.  
47 See Lester Feder & Ellen-Marie Whelan, An Unhealthy Individual Health 
Insurance Market, CTR. FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (Dec. 23, 2008), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/healthcare/news/2008/12/23/5259/an-
unhealthy-individual-health-insurance-market/. 
48 See Joseph P. Newhouse, Assessing Health Reform’s Impact on Four Key 
Groups of Americans, 29 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1714, 1716 (2010). 
49 See Bernadette Fernandez, Health Insurance:  A Primer, in HEALTH CARE 
CRISIS IN AMERICA 84, 90 (Janet B. Prince, ed., 2005). 
50 See, e.g., Melissa Majerol et al., The Uninsured:  A Primer – Key Facts 
About Health Insurance and the Uninsured in America, KAISER FAMILY FOUND.  
(Jan. 13, 2015), http://kff.org/report-section/the-uninsured-a-primer-what-was-
happening-to-insurance-coverage-leading-up-to-the-aca/#endnote_link_136859-8. 
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existing conditions for those who did qualify for coverage in the individual 
market to further cut down on adverse selection.51  Pre-ACA, insurance 
companies could often also decide what to charge.52  “Cherry picking” via 
the underwriting process and fear of adverse selection from an abnormally 
poor health population exacerbated the distribution process and 
incentivized insurance companies to make very conservative actuarial 
assumptions.53  
As a result of all of these factors, the rates for coverage in the 
individual and small group markets were generally higher than they were in 
a normal functioning insurance market and the availability of coverage 
varied greatly between insurance companies.54  
Much of the ACA’s uninsured initiatives attempt to rationalize the 
individual and small group market through a number of restrictions on 
underwriting, the regulation of insurance rates, and a concept that we will 
explore later called “shared responsibility.”  
 
B. THE ACA’S PRIMARY UNINSURED COMPONENTS: THE INSURANCE 
EXCHANGE, THE MANDATE AND MEDICAID 
 
The part of the ACA that has received the most coverage and 
visibility to date is the exchange/mandate concept, which is an effort to 
ameliorate adverse selection and to bring more competition into the small 
group/individual market and eventually the entire employer-sponsored 
market. It is also an effort to make private insurance companies an integral 
part of the uninsured solution.  
Initiatives to make the private health insurance market more 
competitive have been around in various forms for some time. Previous 
labels include the “managed competition” that surfaced in the 1980s and 
was similar to the health insurance purchasing cooperatives in the Clinton 
Administration plan in the 1990s.  
The exchange/mandate concept embraced by the ACA is the latest 
example of these initiatives.  Some believe that competition in healthcare 
finance via exchanges and mandates coupled with tax subsidies will enable 
consumers to choose the best coverage for themselves and assure better 
                                                                                                                                      
51 See Feder & Whelan, supra note 47. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 See, e.g., id.; see also Majerol et al., supra note 50; Newhouse, supra note 
48, at 1716. 
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service than direct government coverage.  Many also embrace the exchange 
concept because of its appeal to the right or middle right of the political 
spectrum. They believe that private insurers in a free market will result in a 
more efficient health care system than a system run by the government. Not 
surprisingly, the mandate/exchange concept was pushed forward in the 
1980s by the Heritage Foundation -- a conservative think tank -- as being 
more in line with our economic market system.55 Ironically, it was the 
Heritage Foundation that decided in 2011 to argue that the mandate was 
unconstitutional.56 
  
1. The Insurance Exchange and Essential Health Benefits 
 
During the debates leading up to the passage of the ACA, many 
strongly believed that Americans should have the choice of a public health 
insurance option operating alongside private plans. They believed that 
having a public option would give them a better range of choices, make the 
health care market more competitive, and “keep insurance companies 
honest.” However, the public health insurance option was ultimately 
dropped from the reform legislation; the insurance sold on the health 
insurance exchanges in the United States will, therefore, now be 
exclusively from the private insurers.57 Off of the exchanges, Medicare and 
Medicaid will continue to serve the elderly and the poor.  Thus, the ACA 
rejected a single-payer, social insurance model in favor of a hybrid 
approach based on a combination of private and government financing and 
guaranteed access to health coverage. 
Under this hybrid approach, the ACA requires each state (and in 
the absence of states doing so, the federal government) to establish an 
“insurance exchange” -- that is, a government-run, easily accessible, and 
consumer-friendly market bazaar, where private insurance companies 
certified by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services offer 
                                                                                                                                      
55 See Avik Roy, How the Heritage Foundation, a Conservative Think Tank, 
Promoted the Individual Mandate, FORBES (Oct. 20, 2011, 8:26 AM),  
http://www.forbes.com/sites/apothecary/2011/10/20/how-a-conservative-think- 
tank-invented-the-individual-mandate. 
56 See Robert E. Moffitt, Individual Mandate Unconstitutional, Unenforceable, 
HERITAGE FOUNDATION (March 23, 2011), http://www.heritage.org/research/ 
commentary/2011/03/individual-mandate-unconstitutional-unenforceable. 
57 See Helen A. Halpin & Peter Harbage, The Origins and Demise of the 
Public Option, 29 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1117, 1117 (2010). 
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plans.58    Individuals can buy health insurance on the exchange and so can 
small employers, which are entitled to a tax credit of up to 50% of the 
exchange premium depending on the number of employees and the average 
salary.59  To discourage oligopoly pricing, each exchange must have two or 
more insurers and at least one must be a “not-for-profit” entity.60  As this 
latter provision suggests, one of the main purposes of the exchanges is to 
increase price competition among insurers.  Another is to assemble larger 
pools in order to reduce adverse selection and promote economies of scale. 
Another way the ACA seeks to increase price competition and 
coverage is through standardization of benefits.  The certified insurance 
plans participating in an exchange must offer a number of standard health 
insurance policies with varying co-pays and deductibles and prices that 
reflect the cost and overhead of providing these coverages.61  The ACA 
labels the standard content of each policy “essential health benefits.”62  The 
ACA’s requirement for standard coverages will facilitate price and service 
comparisons and with it, ideally, price competition.63  That requirement 
                                                                                                                                      
58 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1311(b)(1), 124 Stat. 173 
(2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1)); see also King v. Burwell, No. 14-
114, slip op. at 5 (U.S. Jul. 27, 2015). 
59 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, §§ 1311(b), (d)(2)(A), 1421(a), 
124 Stat. 173, 176, 237 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18031(b), (d)(2)(A) and 
26 U.S.C. § 45R). For tax years 2010 through 2013, the maximum credit was 35% 
for small business employers and 25% for small tax-exempt employers such as 
charities. An enhanced version of the credit took effect on January 1, 2014. In 
general, on January 1, 2014, the rate increased to 50% and 35%, respectively. See 
Small Business Health Care Tax Credit Questions and Answers: Calculating the 
Credit, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (August 11, 2015), 
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Small-Business-Health-Care-Tax-Credit-Questions-and-
Answers:-Calculating-the-Credit. 
60 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 10104(q), 124 Stat. 902 
(2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18054(a)(1), (a)(3)). 
61 Id. §§ 1301(a)(1), 1302, 124 Stat. 162-63 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
18021(a)(1), 18022). 
62 Id. § 10104(b), 124 Stat. 896 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18022(a)-(b)). 
63 To assist in informed comparison-shopping, each exchange must have consumer 
advisers (either in the form of “navigators,” “in-person assistance personnel,” or 
“certified application counselors”) to help consumers understand the application 
process, their eligibility to buy through the exchange, any availability of Medicaid, and 
their eligibility for tax credits and subsidies. Id. § 1311(i); see also In-Person 
Assistance in the Health Insurance Marketplaces, THE CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & 
INSURANCE OVERSIGHT, https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-
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will also have the important effect of expanding available coverage (both in 
the individual market and in employer-sponsored plans).   
The ACA also seeks to ensure universal coverage by guaranteeing 
access, by eliminating exclusions to coverage, and by making coverage 
affordable.  Thus, in order to participate in the exchange, an insurance 
company plan must be certified as meeting the criteria for a qualified health 
plan established by the Department of Health and Human Services,64 
namely: 
o Guaranteed issue -- Insurers are not permitted to 
refuse coverage for any individual or group based on 
health status and, in particular, pre-existing 
conditions.65 
o Restrictions on rescission -- This requirement mirrors 
the guaranteed issue requirement in that an insurer 
cannot cancel and must renew coverage  irrespective 
of health status or the experience of the group and in 
particular pre-existing conditions.66 
o Limits on price variation by class -- Plans must offer a 
form of “community rating,” that is, the same rate 
irrespective of one's health status, age, etc., with two 
exceptions:  use of tobacco and a limited price 
adjustment for specified age bands. There may be one 
community rate for individuals and one for families.67 
o Comparable tiers of plans -- Insurance companies 
must offer four different versions of the standard 
coverages differentiated primarily by the dollar level 
of co-pays and deductibles. These coverages are 
                                                                                                                                      
Initiatives/Health-Insurance-Marketplaces/assistance.html; Gary Cohen, Guidance on 
Certified Application Counselor Program for Federally-Facilitated Marketplace 
Including State Partnership Marketplaces, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. 
(July 12, 2013), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/ 
Downloads/CAC-guidance-7-12-2013.pdf. 
64 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, §§ 1301, 1311(c), 124 Stat. 
162, 174 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18021, 18031(c)). 
65 Id. §§ 1101, 1201(2)(A), (4), 124 Stat. 141, 154-56 (2010) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 18001, 300gg-1, 300gg-3, 300gg-4). 
66 Id. § 1201(4), 124 Stat. 156 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-2). 
67 Id. §§ 1101, 1201(4), 124 Stat. 141, 155 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
300gg). 
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labeled Bronze, Silver, Gold and Platinum Plans.68 
Certified insurers must also offer a catastrophic 
coverage for individuals under age 30 or with hardship 
exemptions with a deductible equal to the high 
deductible plans linked to health savings accounts.69 
For 2016, the limits on deductibles under catastrophic 
coverage plans were $6,850 per year for individuals.70  
o No lifetime limits -- Insurers are not permitted to 
engage in the traditional practice of setting an annual 
or lifetime dollar limits.71  
o Availability of subsidies and tax credits -- Insurers 
must honor subsidies and credits for those whose 
annual income is between 138% and 400% of the 
federal poverty level to help pay for the purchase of 
insurance coverage on an exchange.72 
 
 These provisions are intended to produce universal coverage in 
three important ways.  The guaranteed issue requirement, the limitations on 
rescission, and the elimination of lifetime limits ensure that individuals will 
not be denied coverage due to health status or dollar caps.73  The provisions 
on community rating and tiered plans are both designed to make the menu 
options on the exchanges more affordable for certain customers.  Finally, 
Congress enacted the subsidies and tax credits because many otherwise 
would be priced out of health coverage.74 
 Many of these same provisions, however, shift significant and 
some say unmanageable risks onto insurers.  Under the ACA, insurers are 
deprived of four techniques that they previously used to manage risks and 
discourage adverse selection:  denial of coverage, coverage exclusions, 
lifetime caps, and individual risk-adjusted pricing.  In addition, private 
insurers on the exchanges face added and unwanted competition, both from 
                                                                                                                                      
68 Id. § 1302(d), 124 Stat. 167 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18022(d)).  
69 Id. § 1302(e), 124 Stat. 168 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18022(e)). 
70 How to pick a health insurance plan, HealthCare.Gov,  
https://www.healthcare.gov/choose-a-plan/plans-categories/ (last viewed July 10, 
2016).    
71 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1001(5), 124 Stat. 131 (2010) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-11). 
72 Id. § 1401(a), 124 Stat. 215 (2010) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 36(c)). 
73 See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
74 Id.  
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one another and from the not-for-profit insurers that the ACA requires and 
in fact encourages through regulation, grants and loans.75 These not-for-
profit initiatives focus on the very healthy populations that private insurers 
are trying to attract.   
 The ACA also subjects insurers to added rate regulation to help 
keep policies affordable. In addition to federal review, the states will have 
the ability to ensure that the policies conform to federal standards and that 
rates are supported by verifiable data and subject to the medical loss ratios 
(MLR).76  Under the MLR requirement, insurers (both within and outside 
the exchange) must provide health benefits equaling 80% of the premium 
dollar for individual coverage and 85% for group coverage.  States will 
review insurance company and self-insured data to verify that MLR 
standards have been met and to the degree the benefit requirement has not 
been met, the difference will be rebated to the individual or employer.77  
States are permitted to disapprove or even set lower health insurance 
rates.78 Special review is provided both at the federal and state level for rate 
                                                                                                                                      
75 The law requires the Comptroller General to establish a 15-member board to 
make recommendations to the Secretary of Health and Human Services with regard 
to the award of grants and loans to these not-for-profit plans, known as Consumer 
Operated and Oriented Plans (CO-OPs).  See Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, § 1322, 124 Stat. 187 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18042).  The board 
appointments were made in 2010.  The Center for Consumer Information and 
Insurance Oversight (CCIIO) within the Department of Health and Human 
Services works with the advisory board to assist and advise the Secretary and 
Congress on HHS’s strategy to foster the creation of qualified nonprofit health 
insurance issuers. Specifically, the advisory board provides advice regarding the 
awarding of grants and loans related to the CO-OP program. In these matters, the 
Committee shall consult with all components of the Department, other federal 
entities and non-federal organizations, as appropriate. It will also examine relevant 
data sources to assess the grant and loan award strategy to provide 
recommendations to CCIIO. See id. 
76 Id. §§ 1331(b), 9016(a), 124 Stat. 200, 872 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
18051 and 26 U.S.C. § 833). 
77 Id. § 1001(5), 124 Stat. 137 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(b)); 
see also Department of Health and Human Servs., Health Insurance Issuers 
Implementing Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) Requirements Under the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act; Interim Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 74864, 
74865-66 (Dec. 1, 2010). 
78 See, e.g., Mills et al., supra note 19.  See generally John Aloysius Cogan Jr., 
Health Insurance Rate Review, 88 TEMPLE L. REV. 411 (2016) (arguing that the 
ACA’s expansion of the health insurance rate review process could be a more 
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increases exceeding 10%.79  States are also required to make sure that 
qualified health plans meet state solvency standards,80 such as adequate 
reserves, quality reserves, and prudent management practices applicable to 
all insurance companies operating the state. 
 These requirements all collide with the fact that typically, health 
insurance providers operate with thin margins.81  The ACA’s MLR and rate 
review provisions are likely to cut further into those margins and make 
health insurance carriers more hesitant to continue underwriting risk.   
 The ACA’s new crop of taxes and fees for insurers will only add to 
that reluctance.   Under the ACA, the federal government, state 
governments, insurers, employers, and individuals have a “shared 
responsibility to reform and improve the availability, quality and 
affordability of health insurance coverage in the United States.”82 This 
“shared responsibility” is achieved in part through taxes and fees on 
insurers that not only participate in the exchanges but also those that only 
provide health coverage administration outside the exchange. 
The fees start with the exchange itself. The ACA provides that a 
state with an exchange must “ensure that [its] Exchange is self-sustaining 
beginning on January 1, 2015, including allowing the Exchange to charge 
assessments or user fees to participating health insurance issuers, or to 
otherwise generate funding, to support its operations.”83 
                                                                                                                                      
effective cost containment tool if updated to address contemporary health 
insurance market failures). 
79 45 C.F.R. § 154.200. 
80 See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1322(c)(5), 124 
Stat. 190 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18042(c)(5)). 
81 See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS & THE 
CENTER FOR INSURANCE POLICY AND RESEARCH, 2014 HEALTH INSURANCE 
INDUSTRY ANALYSIS REPORT, at 1 (2014), http://www.naic.org/documents/topic_ 
insurance_industry_snapshots_2014_health_ind_report.pdf (last viewed July 1, 2015); 
see also Avik Roy, Private Insurer Profits?  $13 Billion.  Medicare Fraud?  $48 
Billion.  Health Reform?  Priceless., FORBES, March 4, 2011, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/aroy/ 2011/03/04/private-insurer-profits-13-billion-
medicare-fraud-48-billion-health-reform-priceless/. 
82 Internal Revenue Serv., Questions and Answers on the Individual Shared 
Responsibility Provision, Question 1, http://www.irs.gov/Affordable-Care-
Act/Individuals-and-Families/Questions-and-Answers-on-the-Individual-Shared-
Responsibility-Provision (last viewed June 29, 2015).  
83 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1311(d)(5)(A), 124 Stat. 178 
(2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(5)(A)). 
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There are still other fees or taxes. For example, the ACA imposes a 
Health Insurance Providers Fee on each health insurance company writing 
group coverage starting in 2014 equal to $8 billion allocated among each of 
the companies based on their national market share. This fee will increase 
each year to $14.3 billion by 2018 and will remain in place thereafter 
adjusted annually for inflation.84 
 Another tax is the so-called “Cadillac” tax. Here, health insurers 
(and self-funded plans) must pay a 40% tax that applies to workplace plans 
on any part of monthly premiums paid by employers that exceed defined 
thresholds for single and family coverage.85  Many observers believe the 
“Cadillac tax” will provide an incentive to health plans to control the cost 
of health insurance and for individuals and employers to purchase less 
expensive plans.  In 2018, the thresholds will be $10,200 for single 
coverage and $27,500 for family coverage.86  
These taxes help fund the premium tax subsidies and credits under 
the ACA. The taxes are also designed to encourage employers to reduce the 
amount of coverage for their employees, which will increase tax revenues 
because of the present characterization of healthcare benefits as not being 
taxable income. This exemption from the income tax laws was a historical 
accident and has been questioned over the years, but repeal of the 
exemption never got anywhere because it was politically unpopular.  In 
recent years, however, repeal has been seriously reconsidered since 
reducing the federal deficit has become a top priority.  
 In sum, this combination of severe underwriting restrictions, 
community rating, minimum loss ratios, rate review, required expanded 
benefits, mandatory competition from not-for-profit insurers, and taxes, 
some of which are designed in part to reduce employee healthcare benefits 
sponsored by the employer (even if an employer self-insures and uses a 
                                                                                                                                      
84 Id. § 9010, 124 Stat. 865 (2010) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 4001 note prec.); 
see Internal Revenue Serv., Affordable Care Act Provision 9010 ---- Health 
Insurance Providers Fee, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Corporations/Affordable-
Care-Act-Provision-9010 (last viewed June 29, 2015).  
85 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 9001(a), 124 Stat. 847 (2010) 
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 4980I).  The ACA mandates still other taxes on 
pharmaceuticals, medical device manufacturers, and elective cosmetic medical 
procedures.  Id. §§ 9008, 9009, 9017, 124 Stat. 859, 862, 872 (2010) (codified at 
26 U.S.C. §§ 4001 note prec., 5000B). 
86 Internal Revenue Serv., Section 4980I — Excise Tax on High Cost 
Employer-Sponsored Health Coverage, Notice 2015-16, at 3 (2015). 
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health insurance company only as an administrator), create the perfect 
storm for a business model based on thin margins and high volume.  It is 
also a business model that runs a high risk of large losses and the 
unpredictability of such losses.  Due to these design features of the ACA, 
insurers and employers who self-insure will militate more strongly than 
ever to exit the provision of health coverage. 
 
2. Shared Responsibility for Individuals and Employers: 
The Mandate 
 
The ACA seeks to cure the small pools and adverse selection that 
formerly plagued the individual market through a triad of mechanisms.  Its 
guaranteed issue, no-lifetime-cap, and essential minimum benefit 
provisions give access to universal coverage.  The subsidies and tax credits 
help ensure that access is affordable.  Finally, the mandate imposes fines on 
individuals and large employers who respectively fail to sign up for, or 
provide their workers with, required coverage.87 
The individual and employer mandate is a “pay or play” mandate.  
While the ACA allows individuals to go without coverage and employers 
not to provide coverage, the ACA imposes a penalty on individuals who 
choose not to buy minimum essential coverage88 and on employers that 
refuse to provide that coverage.89   
Acceptable coverage that complies with this mandate includes:90 
 
● Employer‐sponsored coverage (including COBRA 
coverage and retiree coverage) 
● Coverage purchased in the individual market 
● Medicare coverage (including Medicare Advantage) 
● Medicaid coverage 
● Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) coverage 
● Certain types of veterans’ health coverage 
● TRICARE (coverage for members of the military and 
veterans and their dependents) 
 
                                                                                                                                      
87 See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
88 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1501(b), 124 Stat. 244 (2010) 
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A). 
89 Id. § 1513(a), 124 Stat. 253 (2010) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 4980H). 
90 Id. § 1501(b), 124 Stat. 244 (2010) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f)). 
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In 2014, the individual “shared responsibility” penalty was $95 per person 
(or $47.50 per child, capped at $285 per family or 1% of the family’s 
yearly income, whichever was greater).91  The penalty increased each year 
as follows: 
 
2015: $325 per adult and $162.50 per child under 18 
(capped at $975 per family or 2% of the family's income, 
whichever was greater).92 
 
2016: $750 per adult and $347 per child (capped at $2000 
per family or 2.5% of the family's income, whichever was 
greater).93 
 
2017: the same as 2016 adjusted for inflation.94  
Accordingly, the penalty will increase each year, but will 
be capped at the bronze level exchange premium for the 
individual or family.95  
 
Individuals subject to this mandate include children, the elderly, 
citizens living abroad and documented foreign nationals living in this 
country.96  Although the ACA provides for qualified plans and exchanges 
to have mechanisms to deal with unanticipated risks,97 the nature of the 
ACA mandate creates fertile ground for adverse selection.  The key 
question is whether the ACA’s penalties provide enough incentive for 
                                                                                                                                      
91 Id. (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c)(3)(B)); see The fee you pay if you 
don't have health coverage, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/fees-
exemptions/fee-for-not-being-covered/ (last viewed June 30, 2015).  
92 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1501(b), 124 Stat. 244 (2010) 
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c)(3)(B)); see The fee you pay if you don't have 
health coverage, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/fees-exemptions 
/fee-for-not-being-covered/ (last viewed July 11, 2015). 
93 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1501(b), 124 Stat. 244 (2010) 
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c)(3)(A)). 
94 Id. (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c)(3)(D)). 
95 Id. (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(1)(B)). 
96 Id. (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d)). 
97 Id. §§ 1341-1343, 124 Stat. 208-213 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
18061-18063); see also Despite Some Delays, CMS Has Made Progress 
Implementing Programs to Limit Health Insurer Risk, U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-447 (2015). 
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people to buy through the exchange or elsewhere.  The exchange rates for 
New York for 2014, which many characterized as being much lower than 
the non-exchange private market, were revealing.  The average New York 
exchange rate for a single individual on a silver plan was $483 annually 
before federal subsidies. That same average rate was $966 for a married 
couple and $1377 for family coverage.98  That meant that the average 
premium to buy health coverage through the New York exchange was 
about 5 times greater than the penalty during the first year.  
The ACA also specifies “pay or play” penalties for large employers 
that do not provide fully insured or self-insurance coverage for their “full-
time employees.”99  This sharply changes the previous state of affairs 
where private employers could decline to provide health coverage to their 
employees free from any penalty.  First under the ACA, starting in 2015, 
large employers had to pay a penalty if they did not offer minimum 
essential coverage to at least 95% of their full-time employees (and their 
dependents), and at least one full-time employee received a subsidy or tax 
credit for purchasing coverage through an exchange.  Annually, this 
penalty is $2,000 (indexed for future years) for each full-time employee, 
excluding the first 30 employees.100  Second, even where large employers 
offer minimum essential coverage to at least 95% of their full-time 
employees (and their dependents), they must pay a $3,000 penalty for any 
                                                                                                                                      
98 See Zane Benefits, New York Health Insurance Exchange Update – Plan 
Carriers and Rates (July 26, 2013), http://www.zanebenefits.com/blog/bid/306301 
/New-York-Health-Insurance-Exchange-Update-Plan-Carriers-and-Rates (last 
viewed July 11, 2015) (analyzing New York State, Approved Monthly Premium 
Rates – Individual Standard Plans, http://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny. 
gov/files/archive/assets/documents/Approved2014HealthInsuranceRates.pdf) (last 
viewed July 11, 2015) (Computations by Zane Benefits and author). 
99 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1513(a), 124 Stat. 253 (2010) 
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a), (d)(2)(A)). 
100 Internal Revenue Serv., Employer Shared Responsibility Provisions, 
http://www.irs.gov/Affordable-Care-Act/Employers/Employer-Shared-
Responsibility-Provisions (last viewed Sept. 14, 2015).  A “full-time employee” is 
defined as one who works at least 30 hours a week.  Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, § 1513(a), 124 Stat. 253 (2010) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 
4980H(d)(4)(A)).  Under the transition relief provisions for 2015, the large 
employer penalty only applied to employers with at least 100 full-time workers.  
The penalty started to apply to all employers with at least 50 full-time workers in 
2016.  Internal Revenue Serv., Transition Relief, http://www.irs.gov/Affordable-
Care-Act/Employers/Transition-Relief (last viewed July 1, 2015). 
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full-time employee who receives the premium tax credit for purchasing 
coverage through the marketplace.101    
There is no penalty for small employers (defined as those with 
fewer than 50 full-time employees).102  Nor is there a penalty for employers 
that have employees making more than 400% of the federal poverty line or 
$46,000 per family since those individuals would not be eligible for 
exchange subsidies in those states that have expanded Medicaid in 
accordance with the ACA. In states that have not expanded Medicaid to the 
ACA limits, the threshold would be the threshold amount that the state 
requires to qualify for Medicaid.  
To recap, the ACA depends heavily on the individual mandate to 
reduce the number of uninsured and eliminate adverse selection in the 
individual market.  Its penalties are too light, however, to drive enough 
healthy uninsured people to buy coverage.  The same problem affects the 
large employer market, where some employers may find it profitable to 
treat the penalties as a cost of doing business without providing health 
coverage.  Other medium-sized employers may lay off workers or reduce 
them to part-time work to come under the 50 full-time employee threshold.  
Meanwhile, small employers are not subject to a mandate at all. 
To the extent that healthy individuals and employers can avoid 
coverage – either through payment of a penalty or, in the case of small 
employers, none at all – universal coverage will remain elusive and adverse 
selection is likely to persist in the individual market.  Already, health 
insurers on the exchanges are seeking significantly higher rates for 2017 
compared to 2016, on grounds that the individuals insured through the 
exchanges are much sicker than anticipated.103  While it remains to be seen 
whether these insurers’ claims about the extent of adverse selection are 
warranted, the weak penalty provisions of the ACA give cause for concern. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
101 Internal Revenue Serv., Employer Shared Responsibility Provisions, 
http://www.irs.gov/Affordable-Care-Act/Employers/Employer-Shared-
Responsibility-Provisions (last viewed Sept. 14, 2015).  
102   Id. 
103 See Margot Sanger-Katz, Get Ready for Higher Obamacare  
Rates Next Year, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/07/upshot/get-ready-for-higher-obamacare-rates-
next-year.html?_r=0. 
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C. THE CHALLENGES FACED BY INSURANCE COMPANIES IN THE SMALL 
GROUP MARKET 
 
Clearly, the exchange marketplace is not a hospitable place for 
private for-profit and maybe not even for not-for-profit insurers.  Due to the 
guaranteed issue provision, the risk for each insurer is virtually unlimited 
(though moderated somewhat by the reinsurance and risk adjustment 
mechanisms of the exchange).104  Adverse selection is very real because the 
incentive penalties are so much lower than the premium costs of the broad 
exchange coverage, even when one considers the federal subsidy. In 
addition, there is no assurance that the exchange will attract the 
heterogeneous population, especially the younger healthier population, 
needed to distribute risk efficiently.  
Already many healthy young people have decided to avoid the 
exchanges and just pay the penalty, arguing that it's a better deal for them 
financially.  In addition, lack of public understanding and knowledge of the 
existence of the exchange has raised considerable doubt as to whether those 
who can benefit most from the exchange will apply.  Providers of 
healthcare, and in particular hospitals and health insurers, are actively 
reaching out to the public because the absence of large pools and people 
insured by private companies and Medicaid will hurt their bottom line. 
Compounding the problem of adequate heterogeneous pools, 
employers and their advisors are actively looking for ways to avoid the 
ACA’s requirements.  Many employers, even small employers, are 
considering self-insuring or obtaining stop loss to protect themselves from 
unexpected catastrophic claims.105  Other employers are redefining their 
workforces so that they do not meet the full-time employment threshold.106 
Viewed in its totality, the future of private insurance in the exchange 
                                                                                                                                      
104  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, §§ 1341-1343, 124 Stat. 208-
213 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18061-18063).  For discussion of those 
reinsurance and risk adjustment mechanisms, see, e.g., GAO, supra note 97. 
105 See, e.g., PlanSponsor, No Rush to Self-Insure Health Benefits Yet, June 17, 
2015, http://www.plansponsor.com/No-Rush-to-Self-Insure-Health-Benefits-Yet/ 
(last viewed July 1, 2015). 
106 See, e.g., Karen McVeigh, US Employers Slashing Worker Hours 
to Avoid Obamacare Insurance Mandate, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 30, 2013, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/30/us-employers-slash-hours-avoid-
obamacare; ObamaCare Facts, ObamaCare Employer Mandate,  
http://obamacarefacts.com/obamacare-employer-mandate/ (last viewed July 1, 
2015). 
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context is bleak.   Publicly traded private insurance companies remain 
cautious about participation in the exchanges, though they are slowly 
testing the waters.107  This reluctance will persist, especially for companies 
that report quarterly and expect yields competitive with other public stock 
companies.   
In the ACA, Congress assumed that the private insurance sector 
will continue to underwrite health risks for most of the non-elderly 
population.  But nothing requires private insurers to continue to do so.  To 
the contrary, the burdensome nature of the ACA’s provisions is likely to 
eventually drive private insurers out of the individual health insurance 
market altogether.  Meanwhile, large employers will chafe under their new 
obligation to provide health coverage under pain of penalty and will align 
with private insurers to shed their involvement in health insurance.  They 
will be joined by the numerous individuals who discovered to their dismay 
that many of the subsidized plans that are marketed as affordable come 
with high deductibles and co-pays.  With private insurers heading for the 
exits, employers following closely behind, and citizens demanding truly 
affordable health insurance with no costly hidden surprises, an odd 
coalition of forces will coalesce supporting change to a single-payer, 
government health insurance system. 
 
III. THE ACA'S MOST ENDURING LEGACIES:  FUNDAMENTAL 
RESTRUCTURING OF THE MEDICAL DELIVERY SYSTEM 
AND NEW POLITICAL COALITIONS THAT WILL 
CULMINATE IN TRUE UNIVERSAL HEALTH CARE 
 
During the 20th century, the medical delivery system and third-
party payers in the United States “grow’d like Topsy” into a sprawling 
fragmented universe that more often than not has multiple clinicians 
treating non-routine maladies with little or no coordination. Today, this 
fragmented system represents over one-seventh of the total U.S. gross 
domestic product108 and is composed of many diverse stakeholders, both 
with respect to the delivery and payment of care.  
                                                                                                                                      
107 See, e.g., GAO, supra note 21, at 10-11.   
108 CTRS. FOR MEDICAID AND MEDICARE SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH 
EXPENDITURE DATA: HISTORICAL, http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data- 
and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-andReports/NationalHealthExpendData/NationalHe
althAccountsHistorical.html (last viewed June 28, 2015) (computations by editor). 
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According to recent statistics, there were over 5,600 U.S. hospitals 
(both profit and not-for-profit), almost 900,000 physicians practicing in 
many diverse structures in the U.S. (e.g., as sole practitioners, varying 
types of group practices, and employees of hospitals and other institutional 
providers, including state and local governments), over 800 third-party 
payers (a.k.a. insurance companies), and a number of federal and state 
government programs -- the latter providing over 40% of total medical 
expenditures.109  Other stakeholders include pharmaceutical and medical 
service companies and allied professionals, such as nurse practitioners and 
chiropractors. 
There are many reasons why the rate of rising medical costs 
threatens to exceed the growth of GDP, including technology, the volume-
driven fee-for-service reimbursement methodology, and a professional and 
societal culture that embraces a “more is better” mentality. One of the most 
overlooked drivers of medical costs is the transaction cost of dealing with 
the large and diverse number of payment and delivery components of our 
balkanized health care system.  Estimates vary, but most believe that 
changing from the current third-payer system to a government-run, single-
payer system could reduce the annual cost of health expenditures in the 
U.S. – currently running at $2.7 trillion -- by around 16%.110  
Most of the stakeholders in the system make more under the 
fragmented volume-based system and therefore have a vested interest in 
perpetuating it.  This Balkanized system historically deferred to the clinical 
decisions of professional clinicians (though this deference diminished 
                                                                                                                                      
109 Fast Facts on US Hospitals, AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASS’N, 
http://www.aha.org/research/rc/stat-studies/fast-facts.shtml (last viewed July 1, 
2015); CTRS. FOR MEDICAID AND MEDICARE SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH 
EXPENDITURE DATA: NHE FACT SHEET, http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics- 
Data-and-Systems/Statistics-trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/NHE- 
Fact-Sheet.html (last viewed June 28, 2015) (computations by editor); Total 
Industry Overview, INS. INFORMATION INST., http://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/ 
industry-overview (last viewed July 1, 2015); Professionally Active Physicians, 
KAISER FAMILY FOUND. http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-active-physicians/ 
(last viewed July 1, 2015). 
110 See, e.g., Gerald Friedman, Universal Health Care: Can We Afford 
Anything Less?, Dollars and Sense (July 1, 2011), http://www.pnhp.org/news/2011 
/july/universal-health-care-can-we-afford-anything-less; Elisabeth Rosenthal, The 
$2.7 Trillion Medical Bill, N.Y. TIMES, (June 1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2013/06/02/health/colonoscopies-explain-why-us-leads-the-world-in-health-
expenditures.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
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significantly over the last 40 years) and displayed a bias towards evaluating 
the efficacy of a particular product or practice considered alone rather than 
its effectiveness compared to alternatives. As a result, comparative little 
attention was paid to the marginal value of a particular intervention 
compared to its marginal cost. 
The ACA changes this historic paradigm in several significant 
ways and the impact of these ACA changes will be amplified by the 
economic and demographic trends summarized in Section I of this Article. 
Many of these ACA initiatives will be more significant and enduring than 
the much-publicized ACA efforts to cover the uninsured through the 
exchanges and mandates.  
The enduring ACA initiatives are based on several related 
assumptions: 1) the delivery system must be restructured so that every 
entity involved in a medical intervention is accountable for its outcome; 2) 
accountable clinicians should base their decisions on evidence-based 
medicine – in other words, best practices based on real-world clinical 
outcomes data and the marginal cost and therapeutic value of any 
intervention; 3) increased patient satisfaction and participation in the 
intervention process; and 4) changes in payment methodologies that align 
clinician reimbursement with the value rather than the volume of such 
interventions.  
These ACA initiatives are intricately related but can be best 
described by breaking them into three basic categories: 1) value-based 
purchasing; 2) structural changes to the delivery and financing system; and 
3) comparative effectiveness research.  
While most of these initiatives focus on Medicare, most believe 
commercial and other government payers will soon follow suit in one form 
or another for a number of reasons: 1) Medicare is the largest payer for 
both institutional and individual providers and these clinicians will 
gravitate towards its processes;  2) other government payers, such as 
Medicaid and CHIP, will build on the Medicare initiatives;  3) commercial 
payers will try and differentiate their value-based purchasing (via branding 
and somewhat different approaches) and those providing Medicare 
Advantage will build their value-based purchasing efforts on the Advantage 
platform. Over time most stakeholders will gradually move towards the 
Medicare processes because Medicare will provide a “good housekeeping 
seal of approval” for branding purposes and because insurers, in the 
process, can reduce the transaction costs otherwise associated with multiple 
payment systems. 
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A. VALUE-BASED PURCHASING 
  
Reduced to its essentials, value-based purchasing (VBP) is the 
restructuring of the historic reimbursement approach for medical care from 
one based on volume (i.e., the fee-for-service system) to a more efficient 
healthcare system (in which the marginal therapeutic value of any 
intervention must exceed its marginal cost) that also pursues other desirable 
goals.  VBP seeks to accomplish these objectives by linking part of 
healthcare reimbursements to quality measures.111 
Underlying these objectives is the belief that embracing this 
methodology will reduce or flatten the rate of rising healthcare costs while 
improving quality.  Over the last 100 years, VBP has raised its head here 
and there (for example, in the form of the health maintenance organization, 
case management, and various other prepayment arrangements), but 
generally the U.S. healthcare payment system has been dominated by fee-
for-service reimbursement.  
Starting in the early 2000s, VBP received increasing attention, 
especially at the national level.  Congress authorized VBP as a pilot project 
in the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act 
of 2003.112  Pursuant to this legislative initiative, the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (CMS) began implementing demonstration 
programs starting in 2003 that instituted VBP with respect to various 
healthcare providers, such as group practice physicians, hospitals, nursing 
homes and home healthcare services. 
The ACA centralized oversight for these pilot programs under a 
new entity located in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
called the “Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation” (CMMI).113  The 
ACA will fund the center with $10 million annually for 10 years to 
evaluate and identify new payment methodologies that will result in 
improved quality and savings.114  
                                                                                                                                      
111 See, e.g., Anita Archer & Judy Monestime, CMS Value-Based Purchasing 
Program and ICD-10, HIMSS NEWS, 
http://www.himss.org/News/NewsDetail.aspx?ItemNumber=28816 (last viewed 
July 1, 2015). 
 112 Pub. L. No. 108-173, §§ 501(b), 646, 17 Stat. 2289, 2324 (2003); see also 
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 5001, 120 Stat. 28 (2006). 
113  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 3021, 124 Stat. 389 (2010) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1315a). 
114 Id. § 3021, 124 Stat. 394 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1315a(f)). 
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These VBP pilot projects were and are being primarily carried out 
in a fee-for-service environment.  Their main focus is on data collection, 
though several do so in the context of programs with real economic 
consequences for selected stakeholders, primarily hospitals.  Among other 
things, the ACA requires HHS to create comparative websites for hospitals, 
physicians and other providers providing Medicare services. The initial 
websites will provide basic data on each provider and include outcomes 
data as those data become available. 
Several recent HHS rulemakings regarding hospitals illustrate the 
type of programs being developed under the ACA.  In 2012 HHS 
promulgated a rule designed to reduce acute hospital readmission rates. The 
program initially focuses on selected high-cost or high-volume conditions, 
such as heart failure and pneumonia.  Starting in 2013, hospitals serving 
Medicare beneficiaries with high volume conditions, such as chronic heart 
failure, surgeries and infections acquired in hospitals, had to meet certain 
quality targets and if they did not, CMS would make progressive reductions 
in their Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG) reimbursement rate.115 
In 2013, HHS initiated its hospital VBP program for inpatient stays 
in approximately 3000 hospitals across the country. Under this program, 
Medicare will adjust the hospital payment based on either: 1) how well the 
hospital performs compared to all hospitals in the area; or 2) how much the 
hospital’s performance has improved compared to a defined prior 
baseline.116  
                                                                                                                                      
115 Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., Medicare Program; Hospital Inpatient 
Prospective Payment Systems for Acute Care Hospitals and the Long-Term Care 
Hospital Prospective Payment System and Fiscal Year 2013 Rates; Hospitals’ 
Resident Caps for Graduate Medical Education Payment Purposes; Quality 
Reporting Requirements for Specific Providers and for Ambulatory Surgical 
Centers – Part II:  Final rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 53258 (Aug. 31, 2012) (codified at 42 
C.F.R. pts. 412, 413, et al.); see also Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., Medicare 
Program; Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems for Acute Care 
Hospitals and the Long-Term Care Hospital Prospective Payment System and 
Fiscal Year 2013 Rates; Hospitals’ Resident Caps for Graduate Medical 
Education Payment Purposes; Quality Reporting Requirements for Specific 
Providers and for Ambulatory Surgical Centers:  Final rule; correction, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 60315 (Oct. 3, 2012) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 412, 413, et al.); Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, §§ 3001(a)(1), 3008, 124 Stat. 353, 376 
(2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(o), (p)). 
116 Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., Medicare and Medicaid Programs:  
Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment and Ambulatory Surgical Center 
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Physicians are already submitting performance data and the ACA 
mandates a similar program for physicians by 2016.117  More and more of 
these types of programs will be expanded to other Medicare providers as 
time data and methodologies are deemed feasible based on the ongoing 
demonstration projects. 
CMS has also established data collection activities in Medicaid and 
CHIP programs to facilitate the creation of similar projects with 
reimbursement repercussions for these payers.118  Pursuant to the ACA, 
other demonstration projects are setting targets for skilled nursing facilities 
and home health agencies.119  By 2016, targets will be established for 
psychiatric hospitals, prospective-payment-system (PPS)-exempt cancer 
hospitals, hospice centers, long-term care hospitals, and rehabilitation 
hospitals.120  
At the same time a number of other HHS and commercial entities 
are experimenting with bundled payments for situations where multiple 
providers participate in a particular medical intervention.121  The ACA has 
taken the bundled approach one step further: the ACO program -- which is 
not a demonstration pilot but the creation of a new type of entity that will 
be able to contract directly with Medicare and share in any savings the new 
entity realizes relative to a predetermined average benchmark 
                                                                                                                                      
Payment Systems and Quality Reporting Programs; Hospital Value-Based 
Purchasing Program; Organ Procurement Organizations; Quality Improvement 
Organizations; Electronic Health Records (EHR) Incentive Program; Provider 
Reimbursement Determinations and Appeals – Part III:  Final rule with comment 
period and final rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 74826 (Dec. 10, 2013) (codified at 42 C.F.R. 
pts. 405, 410 et al.).    
117 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 3007, 124 Stat. 373 (2010) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(p)). 
118 See Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., Medicare Program; Hospital 
Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems for Acute Care Hospitals and the Long-
Term Care Hospital Prospective Payment System and Fiscal Year 2013 Rates; 
Hospitals’ Resident Caps for Graduate Medical Education Payment Purposes; 
Quality Reporting Requirements for Specific Providers and for Ambulatory 
Surgical Centers – Part II:  Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 53258, 53503-04 (Aug. 31, 
2012) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 412, 413, et al.). 
119 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 3006, 124 Stat. 372 (2010). 
120 Id. §§ 3004, 3005, 124 Stat. 368, 371 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
1395cc, 1395f(i), 1395ww). 
121 See, e.g., CTRS. FOR MEDICAID AND MEDICARE SERVS., BUNDLED 
PAYMENTS FOR CARE IMPROVEMENT (BPCI) INITIATIVE:  GENERAL INFORMATION, 
http://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/bundled-payments/ (last viewed July 6, 2015). 
154 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL Vol. 22.1 
 
reimbursement under Medicare's fee-for-service and DRG methodology.122 
The ACO program will be discussed in the next section. 
 
B. MAJOR STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE DELIVERY AND 
REIMBURSEMENT SYSTEM 
  
The ACA contemplates a new type of network of physicians and 
hospitals called an accountable care organization whose members agree to 
share responsibility for healthcare provided to patients.  Under the ACA, an 
ACO agrees to manage all of the health care needs of at least 5,000 
Medicare beneficiaries for three years or more.123  
The ACO structure is voluntary.124  It is designed to facilitate 
seamless quality care and to make all of the clinicians involved collectively 
accountable for the care each provider provides to an individual patient. 
Providers are “rewarded” with bonuses for slowing the growth of Medicare 
healthcare costs while meeting performance standards, including patient 
satisfaction standards.125 
Under the final rule defining the contours of ACOs,126 there are 33 
quality standards that focus on four key areas: patient/caregiver experience, 
care coordination/patient safety, preventive health, and at-risk populations 
(people who are frail or elderly).127 
The ACO structure is available to physicians in group practices, 
networks of individual physicians, partnerships or joint venture 
arrangements among hospitals and participating physicians, hospitals 
employing physicians, and other providers and suppliers determined by the 
HHS secretary to be eligible for the program.128  Notably, non-clinicians 
                                                                                                                                      
122 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 3022, 124 Stat. 395 
(2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj). 
123 See id.; Jenny Gold, Accountable Care Organizations Explained, NAT’L 
PUBLIC RADIO (Jan. 18, 2011), www.npr.org. 
124 See, e.g., Dep’t of Health and Human Services, Summary of Final Rule 
Provisions for Accountable Care Organizations under the Medicare Shared Savings 
Program (2015), http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/ 
sharedsavingsprogram/Downloads/ACO_Summary_Factsheet_ICN907404.pdf. 
125 Id.; Gold, supra note 123. 
126 Dep’t of Health and Human Services, Medicare Program; Medicare 
Shared Savings Program:  Accountable Care Organizations; Final Rule, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 67802 (Nov. 2, 2011). 
127 Id. at 67889-90. 
128 Id. at 67808.  
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must work through clinicians,129 which will enhance physician autonomy 
vis-à-vis third party payers and other non-clinician “partners.” 
An ACO must meet certain criteria and be approved by HHS.  Key 
conditions include: 1) a governing body representing ACO providers and 
patients; 2) accepting responsibility for at least 5,000 Medicare fee-for-
service beneficiaries; and 3) providing a detailed plan acceptable to the 
secretary regarding how the ACO plans to deliver quality and lower the 
growth of expenditures, including procedures for routine self-assessment 
monitoring and the reporting of care it provides plus a process to use the 
data to continually improve the ACO's quality and cost performance.130  
This latter provision expects ACOs to be active practitioners of evidence-
based medicine. 
Once certified, the ACO must participate in the program for at least 
three years.131  CMS can terminate the program if the ACO fails to comply 
with the eligibility and program requirements.132 
While certified ACO structures may vary somewhat, each must 
meet the general requirements listed above.  Conceptually the foundation of 
the ACO will be primary care physicians, responsible for treating groups of 
patients linked together with participating specialists, hospitals, and 
electronic records systems. 
Any certified ACO that meets the plan quality standards will be 
eligible to receive a share of the saved earnings relative to a predetermined 
and updated benchmark. The final rules also provide that an ACO may 
choose a higher shared savings rate if it agrees to share in any losses.133  
Contemporaneous with this ACO “shared savings” rulemaking, 
CMS’s “innovation center” released a demonstration project for smaller 
ACO entities that are physician-owned or located in rural locations to 
receive advance payments (of up to $250,000) for investments in 
infrastructure and caregiving staff.134  CMS also unveiled a series of 
demonstration projects providing for provider remuneration based on 
bundled payments for an episode of care -- where all providers involved in 
                                                                                                                                      
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 67807-08, 67816-30.  
131 Id. at 67807, 67977. 
132 Id. at 67982-83. 
133 Id. at 67909-12. 
134 See CTRS. FOR MEDICAID AND MEDICARE SERVS., ADVANCE PAYMENT 
ACO MODEL, http://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/Advance-Payment-ACO-
Model/ (last viewed July 6, 2015). 
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treating a patient will share in the bundled or single episode payment.135  
Clearly the end goal of “shared savings” is to align provider incentives with 
health outcomes – in other words, to create accountability.  
Another important Medicare cost containment measure involves 
the ACA’s changes to the Independent Medicare Advisory Board 
(IMAB).136  IMAB is a 15-member agency137 designed to strengthen the 
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC).  MedPAC’s job for 
many years was to make recommendations to achieve specific savings in 
Medicare without affecting coverage or quality.138  The old MedPAC had 
no power whatsoever because any of its recommendations had to be 
approved by Congress.139  Of MedPAC’s many recommendations over the 
years, none was approved by Congress.  
The new IMAB has roughly the same charge – to make proposals 
to Congress to “reduce the per capita rate of growth in Medicare 
spending”140 – but its power is enhanced by its structure.  First, each 
member is appointed by the president for staggered terms with advice and 
consent of the Senate.141  Second, IMAB’s recommendations automatically 
go into effect unless Congress adopts an equally effective recommendation 
with approval by both houses, including at least three-fifths of the 
                                                                                                                                      
135 See CTRS. FOR MEDICAID AND MEDICARE SERVS., BUNDLED PAYMENTS 
FOR CARE IMPROVEMENT (BPCI) INITIATIVE:  GENERAL INFORMATION, 
http://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/Bundled-Payments/ (last viewed July 6, 
2015). 
Other non-Medicare payers are beginning to explore bundling options.  See 
Suzanne Delbanco, The Payment Reform Landscape: Bundled Payment, HEALTH 
AFFAIRS BLOG, (July 2, 2014),  http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/07/02/the-
payment-reform-landscape-bundled-payment.  Key to organizational decisions to 
embrace bundled payments are the availability of relevant data, a robust IT system 
with the analytical ability to evaluate outcomes, and the level and type of risk 
(operational or insurance) that providers are willing to accept.   
136 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, §§ 3403, 10320, 124 Stat. 489, 
949 (2010) (codified in part at 42 U.S.C. § 1899A). 
137 Id. § 3403(a)(1), 124 Stat. 489, 502 (2010) (codified in part at 42 U.S.C. § 
1899A(g)(1)(A)(i)). 
138 See David Newman & Christopher M. Davis, The Independent Payment 
Advisory Board, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 30 (No. 7-7500, 2010). 
139 See id. 
140 Id. at 2. 
141 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 3403(a)(1), 124 Stat. 489, 
502-03 (2010) (codified in part at 42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk(g)(1)(A)(i)). 
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Senate.142 IMAB’s cost control recommendations for Medicare 
consequently have significantly more teeth. 
Still other significant changes, such as the shifting of Medicare 
funding for residencies in teaching hospitals to community hospitals and 
clinics,143 are designed to reinforce the ACA's structural changes essential 
to a primary care/CER foundation, including the trend towards evidence-
based medicine and advanced continuity and coordination of care.  
While there is no “silver bullet” for better individual outcomes, 
better healthcare for populations, and lower expenditure growth, there is a 
widespread consensus that the best chance for meeting all three goals 
requires the alignment of provider treatments with accountability.  There is 
also widespread consensus on the need for more evidence-based medicine 
and particularly the degree to which new procedures and practices provide 
better results than existing ones.  Realizing evidence-based medicine and 
best practices is the ultimate goal of another primary ACA objective: 
comparative effectiveness research. 
 
C. COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH: AN IDEA WHOSE TIME 
HAS COME 
 
1. What is CER? 
 
 Although we have in place a system to test the safety of drugs and 
medical devices, the Institute of Medicine estimates that over one half of all 
medical procedures have not been subject to rigorous evaluation.144  The 
ACA attempts to change this by expanding the evaluation process to 
                                                                                                                                      
142 See Timothy Stolzfus Jost, The Independent Payment Advisory Board, 363 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 103, 105 (2010); Newman & Davis, supra note 138, at 51. This 
procedure resembles the successful procedure instituted for recommendations on 
military base closings in the legislation establishing the Defense Base Closure and 
Realignment Commission.  Topher Spiro, The Independent Payment Advisory 
Board, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (March 5, 2012),  
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/healthcare/report/2012/03/05/11269/the-
independent-payment-advisory-board/ (last viewed June 16, 2016). 
143 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 5503, 124 Stat. 655 (2010) 
(codified in part at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(h)(8)). 
144 Inst. of Med., Best Care at Lower Cost: The Path to Continuously Learning 
Health Care in America 150-151 (Mark Smith et al. eds., 2012). 
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encompass all aspects of health care:145 alternative medical delivery 
structures, alternative clinical interventions and alternative drugs and 
medical devices. Not all existing practices can be changed at once. Instead, 
they will be evaluated in stages in accordance with priorities established by 
the Institute of Medicine reinforced by an elaborate structure of clinical 
experts and other stakeholders in the system.  
 There is no uniform definition of CER, but the definition 
formulated by the former Federal Coordinating Council for Comparative 
Effectiveness Research is often used to describe it.  CER, according to the 
Council, is:146 
 
[…]the conduct and synthesis of research comparing the 
benefits and harms of different interventions and strategies 
to prevent, diagnose, treat and monitor health conditions in 
“real world” settings. The purpose of this setting is to 
improve health outcomes by developing and disseminating 
evidence-based information to patients, clinicians, and 
other decision-makers, responding to their expressed 
needs, about which interventions are most effective for 
which patients under specific circumstances. 
 
Even this definition does not capture the true significance of CER, which 
can be best described by articulating how the present evaluation process 
works and its impact upon the way medical care is delivered and paid for 
today. 
The traditional evaluation approach or clinical trial measures the 
efficacy of a particular treatment: that is whether the treatment produces or 
does not produce a marginal benefit in the artificial world of the laboratory 
measured against a randomized control group. The American Medical 
Association's characterization is revealing:147 
 
                                                                                                                                      
145 For the ACA’s provisions on comparative effectiveness research, see the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, §§ 3011, 3501, 6301(a)-(c), 124 Stat. 
378, 507, 707-42 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 280j, 299b-33, 299b-37, 1320e, 
1320e-1). 
146 Federal Coordinating Council for Comparative Effectiveness Research, 
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 5 (2009) (emphasis added).  
147 Advocacy with the Administration: Comparative Effectiveness Research, 
AM. MED. ASS’N,  http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/advocacy/federal/advocacy-
with-administration.page (last viewed July 10, 2016). 
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Most current research on medical treatments compares the 
benefits of a specific treatment to no treatment, but little 
information is available to physicians to help them 
determine if new treatments outperform existing options.  
 
  The differences between traditional evaluation and CER will have 
a profound effect upon the delivery and financial structure of medical care. 
More often than not, the traditional clinical trial focuses on comparing the 
“efficacy” of a given treatment to no treatment (via a “control group”), 
rather than also comparing the new intervention’s cost and outcome to 
existing alternative treatments.  In addition, this traditional focus more 
often than not concentrates on new technology and whether a new 
procedure or product is safe “on average,” which dilutes or avoids 
ascertaining whether there would be similar or different outcomes for 
subpopulations based on age, gender, health status and other relevant 
factors.  
 The traditional evaluation process fits into the prevailing medical 
paradigm, i.e., that something new is always better across-the-board.  It fits 
into the prevailing reimbursement paradigm of fee-for-service -- the more 
you do, the more money you make. Both reinforce “for-profit” as opposed 
to “not-for-profit” medicine. 
Of even greater importance, the traditional evaluation process does 
not measure whether the incremental benefit of a new intervention 
outweighs its incremental cost.  This is a highly relevant indicator, along 
with how the new technology’s outcomes compare with existing 
alternatives, of the efficiency of the new medical intervention. 
CER’s potential for cost-benefit analysis is greatly feared by many 
stakeholders in the present system, especially drug and medical device 
manufacturers.  Another controversial aspect of CER is that its findings of 
best practices could be used to mandate a particular treatment under 
particular circumstances.  Although the American Medical Association 
(AMA) has strongly endorsed CER, its focus has been on clinical outcomes 
and it is very explicit regarding the use to which CER findings could be put 
to use:148 
 
                                                                                                                                      
148 Principles for Comparative Effectiveness Research, AM. MED. ASS’N,  http:// 
www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/advocacy/federal/advocacy-with-administration.page (last 
viewed July 10, 2016) (emphasis added). 
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 The highest priority should be placed on targeting health 
care professionals and their organizations to ensure rapid 
dissemination to those who develop diagnostic and 
treatment plans. 
 
 ***** 
 
 The CER entity must not have a role in making or 
recommending coverage or payment decisions for payers. 
 
 ***** 
 
 Physician discretion in the treatment of individual patients 
remains central to the practice of medicine.  CER evidence 
cannot adequately address the wide array of patients with 
their unique clinical characteristics, co-morbidities and 
certain genetic characteristics.  . . . [S]ufficient information 
should be made available on the limitations and exceptions 
of CER studies so that physicians who are making 
individualized treatment plans will be able to differentiate 
patients to whom the study findings apply from those for 
whom the study is not representative. 
 
  It is noteworthy that while the AMA strongly embraces evidence-based 
medicine and comparative effectiveness research, it makes it very clear that 
professional autonomy regarding the use of CER findings is of key 
importance to clinicians. This theme permeates the ACA. For example, 
ACO governance is heavily dominated by clinicians.149  Funds for building 
infrastructure emanate from the government for direct distribution to 
clinicians,150 which reduce the dependence of clinicians upon non-clinician 
“deep pockets” for infrastructure capital.  In addition, the ACA's bias 
                                                                                                                                      
149 Department of Health and Human Services, Medicare Program; Medicare 
Shared Savings Program:  Accountable Care Organizations; Final Rule, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 67802, 67816-22 (Nov. 2, 2011). 
150 CTRS. FOR MEDICAID AND MEDICARE SERVS., ADVANCE PAYMENT ACO 
MODEL, http://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/Advance-Payment-ACO-Model/ (last 
viewed July 6, 2015). 
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towards “not-for-profit delivery systems”151 strengthens the leverage of the 
profession regarding clinical decision-making.  
  Because many in the public equate limits of any kind as 
“rationing,” in view of the importance of clinical autonomy for the medical 
profession and the concerns of all stakeholders regarding the economic 
impact of CER, it is not surprising that a large part of the ACA's CER 
provisions deal with how CER is implemented. 
 
2. Implementation of CER 
 
Most agree that CER, if implemented to its full potential, will 
transform the medical professional paradigm.152  Many, however, are 
skeptical that CER will realize its potential, primarily for three reasons: 1) 
the restrictions the ACA places on the use of CER findings and evidence 
for Medicare and to a more limited degree recommendations to Congress 
by IMAB;153 2) the inclusion of non-clinician stakeholders in the governing 
mechanisms of CER; and 3) the historic reticence of clinicians to abdicate 
their autonomy regarding clinical decisions.  
To be sure all three present challenges. However, these challenges 
are overstated and the way CER implementation is structured not only 
ameliorates these concerns by accident or elegant design but actually 
creates a structure that is best suited to realize CER's potential for clinicians 
and other stakeholders to adopt voluntarily identified and documented best 
practices and increased reliance upon evidence-based medicine.  The 
following will first summarize the governing structure of CER and then 
describe how the structure overcomes the major concerns of skeptics. 
 CER is not a new concept and has been around for some time 
although its implementation has been fragmented in the U.S.  It first 
became centralized with the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
                                                                                                                                      
151 See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, §§ 1322, 10104(q), 
124 Stat. 187, 903 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18042, 18054(a)(3)). 
152 See, e.g., John Aloysius Cogan Jr., The Affordable Care Act’s Preventive 
Services Mandate: Breaking Down the Barriers to Nationwide Access to 
Preventive Services, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 355 (2011) (arguing that the ACA’s 
requirement that public and private health plans provide evidence-based preventive 
services with no out-of-pocket costs effectively transforms those plans into 
vehicles for promoting public health). 
153 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, §§ 3403(a)(1), 6301(c), 
124 Stat. 490, 740 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320e-1(a), (c)(1), 
1395kkk(c)(2)(A)(ii)). 
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2009 (ARRA), which appropriated $1.1 billion to fund CER among three 
agencies: the Department of Health and Human Services, the NIH and the 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRC).154  
 ARRA also created a public entity, the Federal Coordinating 
Council for Comparative Effectiveness Research, to coordinate CER efforts 
at the federal level.155  The Institute of Medicine (IOM) also was given the 
responsibility to establish national priorities for CER156 and IOM 
recommended 100 critically important initial topics for CER research.157 
 The ACA builds upon these concepts and creates a new not-for-
profit corporation that the ACA stresses is “neither an agency nor 
establishment of the United States government.”158  The new entity is 
named the “Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute” (PCORI), 
which replaces its predecessor, the Federal Coordinating Council for 
Comparative Effectiveness Research.159 
 PCORI is directed by a board of governors composed of the heads 
of NIH and AHRQ and 17 other members selected by the General 
Comptroller.  Three board members represent patient and consumer 
interests.  In addition, there must be five physicians and provider 
representatives, including at least one surgeon, nurse, integrative healthcare 
practitioner, and hospital representative.  Other representatives must 
include three private payers, including at least one to represent self-funded 
employers.  Pharmaceutical, medical device, and diagnostic firms have 
three representatives.  Finally one board member must be an independent 
health service researcher and the two remaining members must represent 
state and federal health agencies.160 
  PCORI’s mission is to advance the “quality and relevance of 
evidence” available to patients, physicians, payers, and policymakers.161  Its 
                                                                                                                                      
154 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, tit. 
VIII, 123 Stat. 177 (2009). 
155  Id. § 299b-8. 
156 Id. § 3. 
157 See Inst. of Med., 100 Initial Priority Topics for Comparative Effectiveness 
Research,  http://iom.nationalacademies.org/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/2009/ 
ComparativeEffectivenessResearchPriorities%20/Stand%20Alone%20List%20of%20
100%20CER%20Priorities%20-%20for%20web.ashx  (last viewed July 7, 2015). 
158 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 6301(a), 124 Stat. 728 (2010) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320e(b)(1)). 
159 Id. §§ 1320e(b)(1), 2996-8. 
160 Id. § 1320e(f)(1). 
161 Id. § 1320e(c). 
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responsibilities are to identify research priorities, analyze evidence 
identifying the relevance of current evidence and economic effects, and 
advance broad dissemination of research findings.162  
 The ACA specifically directs PCORI to pursue “comparative 
clinical effectiveness research,”163 which the ACA describes as head-to-
head comparisons of “health care interventions, protocols for treatment, 
care management and delivery procedures, medical devices, diagnostic 
tools, pharmaceuticals . . . , integrative health practices, and any other 
strategies or items being used in the treatment, management, and diagnosis 
of, or prevention of illness or injury in, individuals.”164  
 Part and parcel of PCORI’s efforts is to provide information to 
educate patients so that patients will play a more pivotal role in treatment 
decisions and their relationship with their physicians.165  Whether or not 
PCORI will be able to ameliorate the asymmetry of information between 
doctor and patient and the cultural dominance of clinicians in the doctor-
patient relationship remains to be seen. 
 PCORI has considerable human and dollar resources at its 
disposal.166  Among other things, it has a nationally recognized Executive 
Director and a large staff of experts to evaluate research proposals and 
make decisions regarding these proposals.167 
 Transparency and checks and balances are to be assured by a 
requirement that PCORI submit a draft of research priorities for public 
comment prior to formal adoption.168  The ACA further limits the use of 
PCORI’s conclusions for purposes of Medicare:169 
 
The Secretary may only use evidence and findings from 
research conducted under section 1181 to make a 
determination regarding coverage under title XVIII 
[Medicare] if such use is through an iterative and 
transparent process which includes public comment and 
considers the effect on subpopulations. 
                                                                                                                                      
162 Id. §§ 299b-37, 1320e(c), (d)(1)-(d)(2). 
163 Id. § 1320e(b)(3), (d)(6)(C). 
164 Id. § 1320e(a)(2)(B). 
165 Id. §§ 299b-37, 1320e(c). 
166 See id. §§ 1320e(b)(3), (d), 1320e-2. 
167 Id. § 1320e(d)(6), (f)(1)–(f)(2), (f)(6). 
168 See id. § 1320e(d)(6)(C)(i), (h)(1). 
169 See id. § 1320e-1(a). 
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In addition, PCORI is specifically prohibited from adopting “QALY” or 
similar thresholds for establishing what types of care are cost-effective.170  
Medicare decisions cannot be made “in a manner that treats extending the 
life of an elderly, disabled, or terminally ill individual as of lower value 
than” an individual who is not.171  Similarly, the Secretary of HHS is 
specifically prohibited from adopting a QALY or similar metric for 
establishing what types of care are cost-effective.172  
These ACA limitations conclude by saying “nothing in . . . [the 
ACA should] be construed as superseding or modifying the coverage of 
items or services . . . that the Secretary [of HHS] determines are reasonable 
and necessary under” existing law:173 
 
(b) Nothing in section 1181 shall be construed as – 
(1) Superseding or modifying the coverage of items 
or services under title XVIII that the Secretary 
determines are reasonable and necessary under 
section 1162(l)(1); or 
(2) authorizing the Secretary to deny coverage of 
items or services under such title solely on the 
basis of comparative clinical effectiveness 
research. 
 
Though these limitations appear severe and far-reaching, they do 
not apply to voluntary professional clinical decisions under Title XVIII. 
Nor do these limits apply beyond HHS Medicare regulations.  The new 
IMAB is subject to roughly the same restrictions although the language is 
different and appears somewhat narrower in scope:174  
  
                                                                                                                                      
170 “QALY” is a metric consisting of a “quality-adjusted life year.”  QALY 
adjusts the value of a year of added life by the quality of life that year.  See Nat’l 
Inst. for Health and Clinical Excellence, Measuring Effectiveness and Cost 
Effectiveness: The QALY (Apr. 20, 2010), 
https://www.nice.org.uk/proxy/?sourceurl=http://www.nice.org.uk/newsroom/featu
res/measuringeffectivenessandcosteffectivenesstheqaly.jsp. 
171 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 6301(c), 124 Stat. 740 (2010) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320e-1(c)(1)). 
172 See id. § 1320e-1(d)(1). 
173 Id. § 1320e-1(b). 
174 Id. § 1395kkk(c)(2)(A)(ii). 
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[An IMAB] proposal shall not include any 
recommendation to ration health care, raise revenues or 
Medicare beneficiary premiums under section 1818, 
1818A, or 1839, increase Medicare beneficiary cost-
sharing (including deductibles, coinsurance, and 
copayments), or otherwise restrict benefits or modify 
eligibility criteria.  
 
Consequently, despite the vagaries of these statutory limitations, it 
is clear that Congress preferred that PCORI’s findings and evidence and 
IMAB’s recommendations be implemented “voluntarily” by clinicians. 
 
3. Potential obstacles to the implementation of CER 
 
Most skeptics emphasize the ACA’s CER Medicare restrictions as 
the main impediment to successful implementation of CER. To be sure, the 
process restrictions on the use of PCORI findings and research are 
significant, but they are not as onerous as the skeptics claim.   
First, the restrictions are limited to decisions within Medicare 
coverage, and to a more limited degree to cost control recommendations by 
IMAB. The restrictions do not limit the use of PCORI findings for other 
government programs and private sector coverage.   Second, the 
transparency process, which is much like federal rulemaking, will often 
result in a better product if the old adage “more heads are better than one” 
has any efficacy.  Many regulators have found that stakeholders -- even 
those opposed to a proposed regulation -- often come up with better ideas 
or find mistakes that the regulators overlooked. When these deficiencies are 
identified in the public comment process, regulators have a chance of 
correcting them. Even if there are no deficiencies and stakeholders are 
adamant in their opposition, the regulator gets the additional advantage of 
knowing what issues will be opposed, the arguments for those positions 
and the opportunity to develop counter-arguments.  A PCORI finding or 
evidence that successfully runs the required ACA procedural gauntlet will 
only have its legitimacy and credibility enhanced, which will greatly 
increase the chances of acceptance by clinicians. 
Skeptics also believe that non-clinician stakeholders participating 
in PCORI governance will greatly increase the danger of regulatory 
capture.  For the very same reasons articulated above, the ACA process 
mitigates this danger and in fact may reduce the risk of such capture 
considerably.  
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The third major concern articulated by skeptics relates to the 
absence of a mandate for clinicians to accept PCORI findings.  Skeptics 
point to the historic reticence of clinicians to give up any autonomy and in 
particular to give it up to the government. This argument overlooks the fact 
that the polestar of PCORI is voluntary acceptance of its findings and/or 
evidence. Whether or not clinicians will accept or reject PCORI findings 
and/or evidence remains to be seen. Clinicians will certainly prefer the 
PCORI process to the restrictions imposed by the insurance industry over 
the last 40 years.  In addition, odds are that credible PCORI findings and/or 
evidence will be accepted by clinicians, especially if PCORI is viewed as 
“a trusted source.”  Although it has been amply documented (including 
through John Wennberg's small practice variations studies175 and initiatives 
such as the Dartmouth Atlas of Medicine176) that clinician decision-making 
has an aspect of “herd” autonomy -- that is, clinicians, at least to date, have 
been influenced more by the professional socialization process, i.e., where 
they went to school and what their peers do, than by evidence when making 
clinical care decisions – there is growing evidence in recent years that 
clinicians are increasingly embracing evidence-based medicine.177   
In sum, either because of political necessity, accident or elegant 
design, PCORI’s focus on transparency and voluntary adoption by 
clinicians appears to be the optimal route to the implementation of CER 
and evidence-based medicine for clinicians. 
 
IV.  PROGNOSIS (OR A BETTER TITLE ANYONE?  SUCH AS 
“PULLING IT ALL TOGETHER.”)  
 
Despite the bungled rollout of the ACA and resulting public 
confusion over the ACA's access options, exchanges, mandates and 
subsidies, the ACA has resulted in expanded coverage for some 16.4 
                                                                                                                                      
175 See, e.g., Klim McPherson, John E. Wennberg, Ole B. Hovind & Peter 
Clifford, Small-Area Variations in the Use of Common Surgical Procedures: An 
International Comparison of New England, England, and Norway, 307 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 1310 (1982). 
176 Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care, http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/ (last 
viewed June 28, 2015). 
177 See, e.g., Atul Gawande, Overkill, NEW YORKER, May 22, 2015, at 42, 52-
53; Earl P. Steinberg & Bryan R. Luce, Evidence Based? Caveat Emptor!, 24 
HEALTH AFFAIRS 80 (2005). 
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million uninsured178 through the prohibition of pre-existing exclusions, 
expanded age participation for dependents on parents’ policies, and 
Medicaid expansion in those 29 states plus the District of Columbia that 
opted for expansion under the ACA. Now that the “glitches” that 
manifested themselves during the rollout are being remedied, more will be 
covered not only through the exchange market but also by Medicaid since 
one of the functions of the exchanges is to refer Medicaid eligibles to the 
government program. 
Even so, public opinion regarding the ACA and the President 
remains sharply divided and repeal or substantial change is not beyond the 
realm of possibility if the Republican Party captures the White House and 
both houses of Congress in 2016. 
However, any change will not be quite as expected largely because 
of benefits from the ACA itself and the societal changes described in 
Section I of this Article.  Even if those favoring repeal come into 
ascendancy, their options will be severely limited due to the millions of 
newly covered uninsureds. Even those who were already insured when the 
ACA went into effect are weary of change and uncertainty and these 
uncertainties and anxiety will force those that advocate change to be very 
cautious -- especially as the employer's role diminishes.  
Any new changes will create turmoil and shift public opinion from 
the existing distrust of ACA's real or perceived coercion regarding the 
individual mandate to an environment that underscores the absolute need 
for and practicality of having coverage. This need has been embraced by 
most of the stakeholders and is of particular importance to institutional 
providers and large portions of the individual medical community. While 
some elements of the population and clinicians are still holding out, in the 
end practicality will trump the historic infatuation with free choice. 
The changes that do occur or have the most likelihood of occurring 
will be limited to ACA's “free-market” access programs discussed in 
Section II. The lasting and enduring legacies of the ACA discussed in 
Section III of this Article will remain in place for several reasons. 
                                                                                                                                      
178 Department of Health and Human Services, Health Insurance Coverage 
and the Affordable Care Act 1 (May 5, 2015), 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/2015/uninsured_change/ib_uninsured_change.pd
f (last viewed July 8, 2015).  That represents a 35% reduction in the number of 
uninsured individuals from 2013 (the final year before the ACA fully went into 
effect) through first quarter 2015.  See id. 
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First and foremost will be the new and expanded political 
constituencies favoring direct coverage rather than guaranteed access 
accompanied by evidence-based medicine and greater clinical autonomy 
that exists today over clinical decisions.  For example, between 2014 and 
2020, the Medicare population is projected to increase by 21% to 54.8 
million beneficiaries179 due to the onset of retirement for the baby boomers.  
Over the same period, the Medicaid population is projected to increase by 
12%, to 65 million,180 due to the 29 states and the District of Columbia that 
have opted into the program and the likelihood that other states will change 
their mind and will welcome at least 10 years of fiscal relief from Medicaid 
liabilities.181  Many also believe the Medicaid population will increase also 
because the gap between the have and have-nots will increase rather than 
decrease.  Institutional providers and individual clinicians will support this 
increase in Medicare and Medicaid participation to ensure cash flow for 
their operations. 
The medical clinicians will consolidate for the same reasons. The 
growth of ACOs will accelerate for similar reasons as well as for another 
very important one: the ACO structure leverages clinician power vis-à-vis 
other stakeholders and restores to them a fair amount of the autonomy they 
had lost to third-party payers over the last 40 years. 
                                                                                                                                      
179 CTRS. FOR MEDICAID AND MEDICARE SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH 
EXPENDITURE DATA:  PROJECTED, NHE PROJECTIONS, 2013-2023 – TABLES, tbl. 1, 
http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/NationalHealthAccountsProjected.html (last 
viewed July 9, 2015) (computations by editor). 
180 Robin Rudowitz, A Look At CBO Projections For Medicaid and CHIP, 
KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (June 5, 2014), http://kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/how-
much-will-medicaid-cost-in-the-future-and-why-a-look-at-federal-projections/ (last 
viewed July 8, 2015) (computations by editor). 
181 To encourage states to sign up for Medicaid expansion, the ACA stipulated 
that the federal government would pay for 100% of that expansion through 2016.  
Starting in 2017, the federal contribution will drop slowly every year and then 
plateau at 90% in 2020 (and for all subsequent years).  See Matt Broaddus & 
January Angeles, Federal Government Will Pick Up Nearly All Costs of Health 
Reform’s Medicaid Expansion (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, March 28, 
2012), http://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-government-will-pick-up-nearly-all-
costs-of-health-reforms-medicaid-expansion (last viewed July 8, 2015); Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 2001(a)(3)(B), 124 Stat. 272 (2010) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3696d(y)). 
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Last but not least, the employer community (both large and small) 
is eager to move rapidly away from employers’ traditional role as sponsors 
of health plans either by no longer providing such plans, encouraging 
employees to move to the exchanges, or shifting to a defined contribution 
rather than defined benefit environment.  New employers in particular will 
be loath to go back to the system of the last 60 years.  
All of these constituencies have a similar agenda: 1) shifting actual 
or moral responsibility for healthcare plan formation and administration 
from the private sector to the government; 2) a belief that healthcare 
efficiencies will only be realized through universal participation (a large 
diversified group with resulting cross subsidies and uniform procedures); 
and 3) a consensus that healthcare efficiencies can be best realized through 
“evidence-based medicine” and best practices.  This latter consensus is 
even embraced by the medical community as long as clinical autonomy is 
restored and best practice findings are “voluntary” and considered by 
clinicians as emanating from a “trusted source.” 
For these reasons the enduring legacies described in Section III of 
this Article will remain in place as long as the VBP/CER protocols are 
maintained.  Diverse participation in decision-making, transparency and 
voluntary acceptance are essential to CER being a “trusted source.” 
The ACA may also have another benefit though this in my mind is 
more of an aspirational than a likely result.  Maybe stated a better way is 
that these aspirational hopes will be the most difficult to overcome.  
The ongoing dialogue regarding the flawed ACA rollout hopefully 
will educate the public that the private model is not sustainable, equitable 
or workable. Hopefully the dialogue will educate the public that we are all 
in this together. Hopefully the young invincibles will realize that the need 
for medical care for them is not an option or in the “if” category -- instead 
it is just a matter of “when” -- which can happen at any time whether by 
sickness or accident.  
The ACA debate will also hopefully educate the body politic that 
there is no benefit or plan known to man that does not have limits, because 
we do not have infinite resources. In addition, life itself has limits and this 
may be the most difficult concept for any of us to accept. Hopefully the 
ACA will help by giving all of us the grace to accept that fact. 
  

